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PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS
UNDER RAPANOS: DEFINING "THE
WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES"
ADAM REDDER*

INTRODUCTION

When can a landowner dredge and fill wetlands on his or her
property without fear of intervention by the federal government?
If one wants to build a structure on his or her property, should he
or she be concerned about the small stream or wetland in the
backyard? Does the size of the stream or wetland matter? Does
it matter if the stream flows continuously throughout the year?
What if there is a lake nearby? What if one receives a nod from
state authorities to go forward with a development project-can
one initiate such a project without authorization from the federal
government? The answer to these questions is unclear even in
light of a recent United States Supreme Court case specifically
addressing the matter.1
The scope of federal jurisdiction over wetlands and other land
features exhibiting saturated soil conditions in the United States
is defined by the Clean Water Act (hereinafter CWA).2 The
Supreme Court has attempted to appropriately define the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Environmental
Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, December 2004.
1 See Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2208 (2006) (indicating that the Justices of the
Supreme Court reached a 4-1-4 decision, with four Justices forming a plurality, one
Justice authoring a concurrence and four Justices dissenting); see also CLAUDIA
COPELAND & ROBERT METZ, THE WETLANDS COVERAGE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT IS
REVISITED BY THE SUPREME COURT: RAPANOS V. U.S. (The Library of Congress 2006)

available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/060ct/RL33263.pdf (stating that while
the court reached a decision in this case, it provided little clarification to earlier decisions
on the subject).
2 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2007) (defining federal jurisdiction as covering "the waters
of the U.S."); see also Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208 (establishing that "navigable waters"
are "the waters of the U.S., including the territorial seas.").
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boundary of federal jurisdiction under the CWA for over twenty
years.3 One of the reasons there is no well-defined boundary to
this jurisdiction may be because water is a fluid substance. It
flows irrespective of state or national boundaries, downstream
and out to the oceans. As a result, it is unclear where federal
authority ends and state authority begins. Recently, in Rapanos
v. United States,4 the Supreme Court made another attempt to
define the scope of federal jurisdiction with regard to the CWA by
issuing a fractured plurality decision.5 The Court was hoping to
resolve this issue by providing a workable rule that alerts
landowners to the appropriate circumstances giving rise to
federal jurisdiction, but it failed to reach a consensus.6
This Note will first briefly address the history of federal
regulation of the nation's waters, and will then analyze the
Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos. Next, this note will refute
the plurality's unprecedented reading of the CWA and discuss
how the various legitimate interpretations of the case provide for
broader implications in related litigation in the future.
I. HISTORICAL SETTING AND BACKGROUND

A. The Shifting Concern of National Water Policy
National water policy with regard to wetlands protection can
be characterized as a policy of constant change and
3 The Court first addressed the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water
Act in U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985), and later addressed the
same question in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr's,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC].
4 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208.
' Id. (delivering a 4-1-4 decision on the issue of whether several wetlands connected to
navigable waters through ditches or human-made drains were within scope of federal
jurisdiction under CWA); see COPELAND, supra note 1 (discussing the Supreme Court's
split decision in Rapanos).
6 In Rapanos, the plurality determined that wetlands were covered by the CWA only
if
their flow was relatively permanent, and had a continuous surface connection to
traditionally defined "waters of the U.S." See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2221, 2226. M. Reed
Hopper is a principal attorney with the Pacific Legal Foundation who represented Mr.
Rapanos in the U.S. Supreme Court. See also M. Reed Hopper, Rapanos v. U.S. A
Comment, 1-3 LEXISNEXIs REAL ESTATE REP. 33 (2006). Mr. Hopper concluded from the
Rapanos decision that federal agencies have no authority under the CWA to regulate: (1)
truly isolated, non-navigable, intrastate water bodies; (2) any area merely because it has
a hydrological connection with downstream navigable-in-fact waters, and; (3) remote
drains and ditches with insubstantial flows. Id.
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manipulation.7 Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, no
federal legislation existed that adequately regulated an
important national highway of commerce-the nation's navigable
waterways. 8 Neither the states nor the federal government had a
workable system of laws that could prevent obstructions on the
nation's rivers. 9 Acknowledging this problem, Congress enacted
the principal Rivers and Harbors Act (hereinafter RHA) in 1899
in order to regulate "water transportation and commerce."1
Section 13 under the RHA, known as the Refuse Act, prohibited
the discharge of "refuse" into any "navigable water" when such
discharge would impede or obstruct navigation.1 1 Additionally,
the Refuse Act declared the Army Corps of Engineers
(hereinafter the Corps) as the regulatory agency responsible for
issuing permits for the discharge of refuse.1 2 Although initially

7 See Alyson C. Flournoy, Section 404 at Thirty-Something: A Program in Search of a
Policy, 55 ALA. L. REV. 607, 610-12 (2004) (discussing the Clean Water Act's lack of clear
policy regarding wetlands protection and the shifting directions that have characterized
the EPA's "frequent reinventions" of agency policies); see also Sam Kalen, Commerce to
Conservation: The Call for a National Water Policy and the Evolution of Federal
JurisdictionOver Wetlands, 69 N. DAK. L. REV. 873, 877 (1993) (characterizing the history
of wetlands protection as "one of constant change or struggle in an evolving effort to
develop a coherent policy direction").
" See Kalen, supra note 7, at 879 (discussing the growing necessity for federal river
and harbor legislation in the second half of the nineteenth century because of the absence
of federal common law prohibiting obstructions on navigable waterways); see also William
L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the U.S.-State, Local, and
Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 220 (2003) (explaining that
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 is considered by many as the first piece of federal
water legislation dealing with pollution control).
9 See Sean M. Helle, Note, Aquaculture and Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act: A
Case For Regulation, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2004) (noting that the federal
enactments in the late 1800's were the first federal enactments to address the "integrity
of the nation's waters"); see also Kalen, supra note 7, at 879 (describing the tension
between the states and the federal government prior to the enactment of federal
legislation).
10 See Helle, supra note 9, at 1016 (highlighting the fact that the various Rivers and
Harbors Acts of the late 1800's were established expressly to deal with the issue of
obstruction's on nation's waterways rather than water pollution); see also Kalen supra
note 7, at 879 (noting that Congress responded to the need for an obstruction policy by
enacting the various Rivers and Harbors Acts).
" 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2007); SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 178 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(explaining that Section 13 of the RHA, known as the Refuse Act regulated the discharge
of refuse into navigable waters).
12 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress granted
the regulatory power to the Corps in the Refuse Act and then broadened that power in the
Clean Water Act); Kalen, supra note 7, at 880 (noting that the Secretary of the Army
regulated the issuance of permits under the Refuse Act).
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enacted to prevent obstructions, the Refuse
13 Act became the first
legislative tool to control water pollution.
By the mid-twentieth century, water pollution resulting from
industrial processes became an issue of national concern. 14 When
a slick of industrial waste on the Cuyahoga River in Ohio caught
on fire in 1969, Congress responded by enacting the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, known today
as the Clean Water Act (hereinafter CWA). 15 The CWA
16
symbolized a jurisprudential shift in federal water regulation.
Preventing water pollution became the primary focus of federal
water regulation, thus replacing the old federal concern of
preventing waterway obstructions.1 7 Congressional enactment of
such programs as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, and the Clean
Water Act characterized the new national focus on pollution
13

See U.S. v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485 (1960) (recognizing the RHA's

capacity to regulate pollutant discharge when it held that the discharge of industrial solid
waste into the Calumet River constituted refuse and therefore an obstruction to a
navigable waterway); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 177-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the growing interest in the use of federal power to protect the "aquatic
environment" brought with in a new interpretation of the Refuse Act); U.S. v. Standard
Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 226 (1966) (holding that the accidental discharge of commercially
viable gasoline, while not a literal discharge of refuse, still fell under the purview of the
RHA because oil "is both a menace to navigation and a pollutant" and has a "deleterious
effect of waterways."); Kalen, supra note 7, at 880-81 (arguing that the Refuse Act's
transformation from a statute primarily concerned with obstructions to waterways to a
statute concerned with water pollution occurred because the language of the Act was the
only legislative tool available that could arguably prohibit the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters).
14 See Kalen, supra note 7, at 877 (explaining that preservation of natural resources
became a national concern in the mid-twentieth century as is exemplified by the passage
of various federal land and resource management statutes); see also Oswego City Sch.
Ctr., http://regentsprep.org/Regents/ushisgov/themes
Dist. Regents
Exam
Prep
/environment/history.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (discussing the heightened concern
with environmental issues during the modern era).
"6 Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2265 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
the incident in Ohio brought water pollution into the national spotlight and action was
needed to restore the quality of water); SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174-75 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (finding that Congress proposed the CWA to prevent industrial waste
disasters in the future).
16 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting that "[d]uring
the middle of the 20th century, the goals of federal water regulation began to shift away
from an exclusive focus on protecting navigability and toward a concern for preventing
environmental degradation."); see also Kalen, supra note 7, at 880-81 (illustrating that
"[a]lthough ostensibly enacted to regulate against obstructions to the navigability of the
nation's waters, Section 13 of the Act subsequently became viewed as a statutory
authority for controlling pollution.").
17 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that this shift in
federal water regulation reached its climax in 1972 with the passage of the CWA); see also
Kalen, supra note 7, at 878-79 (reasoning that between the late 1950s and mid 1970s
water legislation was transformed from promoting commerce to preventing pollution).
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prevention. 8 Indeed, the CWA was "described by its supporters
as the first
truly comprehensive federal water pollution
'1 9
legislation."
B. A Brief History of the Phrase "Navigable Waters"
The early navigation laws dealt with activities on the
"navigable waters of the United States." 20 As a legal term of art,
"navigable waters" was used in the RHA and later in the CWA.2 1
Today, the CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants into
"navigable waters," which is defined under section 502(7) as the
"waters of the United States. 2 2 An astute observer will notice
that the absence of the term "navigable" in section 502(7) gives
rise to the question of whether it should be accorded any
significance.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has addressed the
proper interpretation of this language on more than one
23
Nt
occasion.
This Note will briefly address the history of the
phrase "navigable waters" in order to understand the role it
played in Rapanos.2 4
18

Congressional enactments during the early 1970's illustrated the growing federal

interest in water quality issues: in 1969 Congress enacted the National Environmental
Policy Act, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), in 1970 it passed the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970), and in 1972 Congress
passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (2006), commonly known as the CWA. Major water legislation has been passed in
recent years "to enhance the quality and value of our water resources and to establish a
national policy for the prevention, control and abatement of water pollution." U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/fwpca/05.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2007).
19 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179.
20 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 560 (1870) (explaining that steamship was not
liable under navigation laws unless it was employed on "navigable waters of the U.S.");
see also Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2216 ("For a century prior to the CWA, we had interpreted
the phrase 'navigable waters of the United States' in the Act's predecessor statutes to
refer to interstate waters that are 'navigable in fact' or readily susceptible of being
rendered so."),
21 See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2007) (discussing protection of "navigable waters"
and
improvements of harbors and rivers, generally); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2007) ("The
term 'navigable waters' means the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.").
22 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2007).
23 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2216 (noting that the phrase "navigable waters" was
interpreted in several Supreme Court cases); SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 163 (referencing
CWA's definition of "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States," which include
intrastate waters); U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985)
(discussing phrase "the waters of the United States"); see also Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 560
(addressing proper interpretation of phrase "navigable waters").
24 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208 (determining whether certain wetlands were within
the meaning of "naviagable waters" under the CWA).
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The phrase "navigable waters" originated in England.2 5 At
early common law, "navigable waters" was defined as those
waters subject to tidal flow. 26 The early navigation laws in the
U.S. incorporated this common law rule.27 Although workable in
England, the tidal flow rule created problems in the United
States because of commercial activity that took place in and on
rivers unaffected by tidal flow.2 8 Ships navigating rivers could
avoid liability for the simple reason that a river did not ebb and
flow with the tide. 29 Acknowledging this loophole, in 1870, the
Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball redefined "navigable waters"
as waters that are "navigable in fact" which could be used as
highways of commerce. 3' Thus, the Court established the modern
definition that forms the basic understanding of the term.3 1

25 See Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 (noting that, at early common law in England, usual
test for "navigable waters" was whether body of water ebbed and flowed with the tide); see
also Brian Elwood, Note, Rapanos v. United States: The Supreme Court's Failed Attempt
to Interpret Wetland Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 1343,
1350 n.43 (2007) (describing the English common law definition of "navigable waters").
26 See Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 (discussing applicability of "tidal flow" rule in the
U.S.); see also James Morgan v. Edward King, 35 N.Y. 454, 458 (1866) (referencing "tidal
flow" rule at common law).
27 See Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 (mentioning the test for "navigable waters" at early
common law in England); see also Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 455 (1852),
superceded by statute, Act Extending Jurisdiction to Lakes and Navigable Waters, 5 Stat.
726 (1845), as recognized in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 293
(1972) (noting that at early common law, U.S. courts adopted English common law test for
"navigable waters").
28 See Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 (stating that "the ebb and flow of the tide do not
constitute the usual test, as in England, or any test at all of the navigability of waters");
see also James Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458 (noting that common law test for "navigable
waters" should be modified to unique character of waters of the U.S.).
29 See Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 (referencing English common law test for navigable
waters as those which were "subject to the tide"); see also Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. 555,
562-63 (1867) (noting that in the past cases many steam boat owners escaped liability
because "the [C]ourt declared that no act of Congress had conferred admiralty jurisdiction
in cases arising above the ebb and flow of the tide").
30 See U.S. v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 406 n.21 (1940) (reaffirming
the navigable in fact test set forth in The Daniel Ball); Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563
(redefining the test as "[tihose rivers.., which are navigable in fact ... when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes
of trade and travel on water").
31 See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (holding that the term "navigable" be construed
in a manner consistent with the traditional definition as set forth in The Daniel Ball
(citing U.S. v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08 (1940))); see Margaret
A. Johnston, Note, Environmental Law-Clean Water Act-The Supreme Court Scales
Back the Army Corps of Engineers' JurisdictionOver "Navigable Waters" Under the Clean
Water Act, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 329, 337 (2002) (stating that the Court in The
Daniel Ball established the definition of navigable waters that forms the "modern
understanding" of the phrase).
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The cases after The Daniel Ball expanded upon the bare bones
navigable-in-fact definition. "Navigable waters" was stretched by
32
the Supreme Court to include potentially navigable waters,
previously navigable waters, and other waterways susceptible to
navigation.
By the mid twentieth century, the navigable-in-fact rule
underwent some significant changes.34 Initially the scope of the
rule began to change to include other waters not necessarily
navigable-in-fact. 35 This widening of the scope of the navigablein-fact rule may have been influenced by the Supreme Court's
broader interpretation of the Commerce Clause.3 6 Specifically,
the Court expanded the commerce power in 1937 to include
activities that have a "serious effect on interstate commerce. 3 7 In
1941, the Court validated the use of the commerce power to
prescribe the wages and hours of employees of a lumber
manufacturer who shipped goods interstate.3 8 Soon thereafter, in
1942, the Court authorized the use of the commerce power to
32 See The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1874) (holding that despite having to be
improved to accommodate commercial vessels, the river at issue constituted a navigablein-fact river and the fact that vessels sometimes encountered difficulty in travel was
irrelevant); see also Appalachian, 311 U.S. at 407-08 ("A waterway, otherwise suitable for
navigation, is not barred from that classification merely because artificial aids must make
the highway suitable for use before commercial navieation mav he undertnken."I.
33 See Appalachian. 311 U.S. at 407-08 ('Natural or ordinarv condition' refers to
volume of water, the gradients and the regularitv of the flow."): see also Economy Light &
Power Co. v. U.S., 256 U.S. 113, 123 (1921) (holding that a river was navigable despite
artificial obstructions and being out of use for a century and a half).
34 See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 208 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that the Army Corps of
Engineers could consider other relevant factors beyond navigability in determining
Refuse Act jurisdiction); see also U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123
(1985) (stating that "in 1975 the Corps issued interim final regulations redefining 'the
waters of the U.S.' to include . . . tributaries of such waters, interstate waters and their
tributaries, and nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect
interstate commerce" (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975))).
35 See Zabel, 430 F.2d at 208 (stating that previous cases have held that the rule
encompassed factors other than navigability); see also Riverside, 474 U.S. at 123 (noting
that "the waters of the U.S." included nonnavigable intrastate waters).
36 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (defining Congress's power to regulate objects of
interstate commerce which includes the regulation of "the waters of the U.S." as an object
that is substantially related to interstate commercial enterprise); Kaiser Aetna v. U.S.,
444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979) (stating that under the Commerce Clause "congressional
authority over the waters of this Nation does not depend on a stream's 'navigability"').
37 Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937).
31 See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (stating that Congress had power to
regulate activities which substantially affect interstate commerce, including intrastate
shipment of lumber manufactured by employees whose wages were below prescribed
minimum); see also Citicorp Indus. Credit v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 33 (1987) (noting that in
many statutes "Congress has exercised its authority under the Commerce Clause to
exclude from interstate commerce goods which, for a variety of reasons, it considers
harmful").
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regulate certain intrastate activities whose cumulative effect
could substantially affect interstate commerce. 39 Thus, the
Court's broader interpretation of the commerce power to include
within its regulatory framework intrastate activities signified an
increase in the federal government's regulatory powers. 40 As a
result, the stage was set for a broader interpretation of the term
"navigable waters. 4 1
In the 1970's the federal courts started to address the scope of
"navigable waters" under the Refuse Act.42 In 1970, the Fifth
Circuit in Zabel v. Tabb,4 3 enlarged the scope of "navigable
waters" when it held that the consideration of "ecological factors"
permitted non-navigable tidelands to fall under Refuse Act
jurisdiction.4 4 In 1971,4 5 a federal district court in Kalur v. Resor
held that the Corps lacked the authority to regulate non39 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) ("Even if activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce..."); see also
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 119 (16th ed. 2007)
("Wickard set forth the principle of 'aggregation,' which allows Congress to regulate
activity that, taken in isolation, does not substantially affect interstate commerce, on the
ground that multiple iterations of that same activity would substantially affect interstate
commerce.").
40 See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 39, at 106-07 (noting for "nearly 60
years after the New Deal, the Court did not strike down a single federal statute as
exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause" until 1995 when the Supreme
Court held that a congressional gun control law "exceeded the authority of Congress
under the commerce power."); Kimberly Breedon, Comment & Casenote, The Reach of
Raich: The Implications For Legislative Amendments and Judicial Interpretationsof the
Clean Water Act, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1455 (2006) (describing the Court's unfettered
deference to congressional regulation of intrastate activities under the Commerce Clause
during the years between 1937 and 1995).
41 Breedon, supra note 40, at 1442 (highlighting that such a broad interpretation of
the term "navigable waters" has "resulted in a split among the lower courts as to the
reach of Congress's commerce powers to regulate non-adjacent wetlands"). See generally
Elaine Bueschen, Comment, Do Isolated Wetlands Substantially Affect Interstate
Commerce?, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 931, 949-50 (1997) (noting the Supreme Court's opinion in
U.S. v. Lopez, which drastically limited Congress' Commerce Clause power, evoked much
trepidation about Congress' future ability to regulate non-adjacent wetlands).
42 Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 1971) (stating that the Refuse Act
"prohibits the discharge of refuse into any navigable water, or tributary of any navigable
water"). See generally 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2007) (noting § 407 is commonly referred to as the
Refuse Act of 1899).
43 430 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1970).
44 See id. (finding that the Corps should have considered ecological factors even before
pollution became a national concern); see also Bueschen, supra note 41, at 940 (explaining
the significant ecological functions of the isolated wetlands, "such as providing migratory
birds with food, habitat, breeding, and resting areas").
45 See, e.g., Bueschen, supra note 41, at 934 (arguing that the "recent Supreme Court
case, U.S. v. Lopez, also could impede the Corps' and the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction
over isolated wetlands"); see Kalur, 335 F. Supp. at 1 (noting the Refuse Act "provides
that the Secretary of the Army may permit the deposit of 'refuse' in navigable waters.").
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navigable waterways under the Refuse Act despite the potential
for environmental impact.4 6 Responding to the Kalur decision,
the Corps revised its regulations to accord with the opinion.4 7
After the Kalur opinion, the most dramatic shift in navigable
waters jurisprudence occurred with the passage of the Clean
Water Act.
C. The Clean Water Act and Navigable Waters
Enacted in 1972, the Clean Water Act's stated purpose was "to
establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination
of water pollution,, 48 and "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. 4 9
Because of the CWA's modern focus on pollution prevention, in
1971 Congress debated the definition of "navigable waters" under
the CWA in order to determine the scope of the Act. 50 After a
debate between the House and the Senate over the proper
definition of "navigable waters," where the House defined the
term as "the navigable waters of the United States", and the
Senate determined it to mean the "waters of the United States,"
the Conference Committee adopted the Senate's broader
interpretation. 51 Accordingly, section 502(7) as later promulgated
defined "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States. 5 2
46 See Kalur, 335 F. Supp. at 11 (stating that Corps has no authority to deposit refuse
in non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters); see also Bueschen, supra note 41, at 953
(revealing the serious environmental impact that would result from the destruction of
isolated wetlands, such as increased water pollution, flooding and the loss of various
species).
47 See Definition of Navigable Waters of the United States, 37 Fed. Reg. 18,289,
18,290 (Sept. 9, 1972) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 209) (defining "navigable waters" as
"waters which are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible
for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce."); see also Kalen, supra note 7, at
886-87 (noting the Corps' response to the Kalur decision by publishing a new definition of
"navigable waters").
48 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 179 (2001) (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414, 95 (1971)).
49 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2007).
"0 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2007) (defining "navigable waters" as "the waters of the
U.S."); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 180-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the
conferees specific deletion of the term "navigable" was related to the statutes overall
purpose of maintaining the purity of the Nation's waters which was the focus of this
particular debate to begin with-to define the scope of CWA jurisdiction in light of the
statute's goals and purposes); Kalen, supra note 7, at 888-90 (discussing the extensive
congressional debate surrounding the term's definition).
6' See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 180-81 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also H.R. 11896,
92nd Cong. § 502(8) (1971); S.2770, 92nd Cong. § 502(h) (1971); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1465, at
79 (1972) (Conf. Rep.).
62 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2007).
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Moreover, the Conference Report stated that the Senate's
definition was to "be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation. 53 As a result, it appeared that Congress intended
to enlarge the scope of CWA jurisdiction to the greatest
permissible extent.54
D. The Code of FederalRegulations Interpretingthe CWA
Initially, the Corps promulgated regulations that mirrored the
traditional navigable-in-fact rule established at common law.55
Courts wasted no time in questioning these regulations. In
United States v. Holland,56 a federal district court noted the
Conference Committee's deletion of the term "navigable" from the
House Report and held that federal jurisdiction extended to nonnavigable man-made canals that emptied into a bayou.57 In
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,5" another
federal district court, also noting Congress' deletion of the term
"navigable" from the House Report, held that the CWA conferred
federal jurisdiction to the maximum extent permissible under the
Commerce Clause. 59 Responding to these decisions, the Corps
issued a revised statement of its jurisdiction in 197560 and, in
51 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at
144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1 ENVTL. POLICY Div. OF THE CONG. RESEARCH.
SERV., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AMENDMENTS OF 1972,
at 327 (1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY])).
5, See 1999 U.S. Briefs 1178, 24 (stating legislative history of CWA indicates Congress
did not intend to restrict Act to waters that satisfy traditional standards of navigability);
but see id. at 168 n.3 (finding that Congress intended nothing more than to exert its
commerce power over navigation").
5 See Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2216 (2006) (noting that the Corps initially
adopted traditional definition of "navigable waters" (citing 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1)
(1974) (current version at 33 C.F.R. § 321.2(a) (2007))); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168
(discussing the Corps' original interpretation of the CWA).
56 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
57 See id. at 674-76 (finding that Congress intended CWA jurisdiction to extend
beyond the "mean high water line" because of the importance of wetlands to the delicate
coastal environment); see also S. REP. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1495 (1973) (noting that Congress considered it "essential that
discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source").
58 392 F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C. 1975).
"9 See Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686 (stating interpretation of "the waters of the
United States" is "not limited to traditional tests of navigability"); see also U.S. v.
Cumberland Farms of Conn., 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1174 (1986) (citing to the interpretation
of "navigable waters" proposed in Natural Resources).
60 See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg.
31,319, 31,320 (Jul. 25, 1975) (noting that the Corps of Engineers published four proposed
regulations in response to Natural Resources); see also Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2216

2008]

PROTECTINGAMERICA'S WETLANDS

July of 1977, formally adopted new regulitions that expanded
federal jurisdiction to the outer limits of the commerce power,
thus reading the term "navigable" right out of the statute.6 1
Under the 1977 regulations, the Corps asserted jurisdiction over,
among other things, coastal wetlands, freshwater wetlands,
intermittent rivers, and perched wetlands "that are not
contiguous or adjacent to previously identified navigable
waters. 62
Less than a year later, the Corps' 1977 regulations came under
criticism by some members of Congress. 63 Once again lawmakers
attempted to limit the Corps' authority under the CWA to
"waters [navigable-in-fact] and their adjacent wetlands." 64 The
debate engaged both chambers of Congress and eventually was
resolved in favor of the Corps' expansive interpretation.6 5
Notably, Congress framed the debate specifically around the
"issue of wetlands preservation" and consciously addressed the
66
expansive definition of "waters" asserted by the Corps.
Accordingly, Congress rejected attempts to limit the Corps'
jurisdiction and acquiesced to a definition of "waters" that at the
(highlighting that the Corps of Engineers adopted a broad interpretation of "navigable
waters" in response to NaturalResources).
61 See Permits For Activities In Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg.
31,319, 31,324-25 (Jul. 25, 1975) (including within the definition of navigable waters,
among other things, coastal wetlands, mudflats, swamps, marshes, shallows, tributaries,
intrastate lakes, and "other waters" that included intermittent rivers, streams, and
perched wetlands); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 (noting Congress broadened the
definition of "navigable waters" by formally adopting CFR § 323.2(a)(5)).
62 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168; see also, Permits For Discharges of Dredged or Fill
Material Into Waters of The U.S., 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (Jul. 19, 1977) (stating that the
term "the waters of the U.S." includes isolated wetlands, lakes, and other waters that are
not part of a "tributary system").
63 See U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 123, 136 (1985) (noting that
amendments were proposed in both the House and Senate to narrow the definition of
navigable waters); see also Clean Water Act of 1977, H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. §§ 16(a)-(d)
(1977) (outlining the definition of "navigable waters" proposed in House amendments).
64 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 136.
65 See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 137 (citing Senator Baker who stated that the CWA
"retain[ed] the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation's waters exercised in the 1972
Federal Water Pollution Control Act"); see also Clean Water Act of 1997, H.R. 3199, 95th
Cong. § 16 (1997) (retaining the existing definition of navigable waters).
66 See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 137. 'The significance of Congress' treatment of the
Corps' § 404 jurisdiction in its consideration of the Clean Water Act of 1977 is twofold.
First, the scope of the Corps' asserted jurisdiction over wetlands was specifically brought
to Congress' attention, and Congress rejected measures designed to curb the Corps'
jurisdiction in large part because of its concern that protection of wetlands would be
unduly hampered by a narrowed definition of 'navigable waters'." Id. During
Congressional debate, one congressman described the nation's wetlands as "a natural
resource of immense environmental value." 123 CONG. REC. 30994, 30994 (statement of
Hon. Newton I. Steers, Jr.).
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very least included wetlands adjacent to traditionally navigable
waters.6 7
E. Riverside Bayview
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,68 first addressed the Corps'
expansive interpretation of the phrase "the waters of the United
States.,69 This case involved a wetland adjacent to navigable
waters. 70 The Court asked whether, under Section 404 of the
CWA, the Corps had the authority to regulate the discharge of
"fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water
and their tributaries., 71 Applying what is commonly referred to
as Chevron deference,7 2 the Court first asked, whether the
statutory term "the waters of the United States" under the CWA
was ambiguous, and if so, whether the Corps' interpretation was
reasonable in light of the 'legislative history and underlying
policies" of the CWA.73 Noting the difficulty in drawing the line
between where "water ends and land begins, 74 the Court held
that in interpreting "waters" the Corps faced the problematic and
67 See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 138 ("[Elven those [congressmen] who thought that the
Corps' existing authority under § 404 was too broad recognized (1) that the definition of
'[niavigable waters... include[s] adjacent wetlands'."); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-139, at
16 (1977) (demonstrating that the House bill proposed by those who sought a narrow
definition of navigable waters recognized that adjacent wetlands should be included
within navigable waters).
68 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131; see Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2214 (noting the court's
interpretation of "navigable waters" in Riverside limits the jurisdiction of the Clean Water
Act).
69 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133; see Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2216 (stating that "the proper
interpretation" was first addressed in Riverside).
70 See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131 (finding that "the respondent's property is a wetland
adjacent to a navigable waterway").
71 Id. at 123.
72 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)

(establishing the doctrine whereby courts, when faced with a justiciable challenge to a
regulatory agency's decision.making, accord to the agency a relaxed standard of scrutiny
that acknowledges the agency's unique position to better assess questions within its
special expertise); see also Josh Clemons, Addressing Nonpoint Source Pollution in the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits:Could Pronsolino Happen in Mississippi and Alabama?, 21 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 55, 71 (2005) (describing how 'Chevron deference' is indeed quite
deferential").
73 See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132-39 ("In determining the limits of its power to
regulate discharges under the Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which
water ends and land begins... Faced with such a problem of defining the bounds of its
regulatory authority, an agency may appropriately look to the legislative history and
underlying policies of its statutory grants of authority.").
74 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132 ("[Ihe transition from water to solid ground is not
necessarily or even typically an abrupt one.").
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textually unguided task of assessing ambiguous areas such as
"shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs... not wholly
aquatic but nevertheless ...
short of being dry land. 75
Accordingly, the Court looked to the second prong of Chevron
deference-the reasonableness inquiry.7 6 The Court held that the
legislative history, specifically Congress's failure to limit federal
jurisdiction to navigable-in-fact waters in the 1977 debates,7 7
provided "some evidence" that the Corps' interpretation of the
CWA was reasonable.78 Additionally, while not abolishing the
weight of the term "navigable," the Court prudently stated that
Congress's addition of the definition "the waters of the United
States" in the CWA made it clear that the term "navigable" be of
limited import. 79 As a result, a unanimous Court upheld the
Corps' jurisdiction
over a wetland directly abutting an open body
80
of water.

75 Id. at 132.

76 Id. at 134 (discussing that since water moves in hydrologic cycles, that water
quality can be affected by pollutants outside of the traditional realm of navigable-in-fact
waters and therefore, the Corps' consideration of ecological factors in determining that
adjacent wetlands are "inseparably bound up with the 'water' of the U.S.... provides an
adequate basis" for CWA jurisdiction). See generally Jamie A. Yavelberg, Note, The
Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial Deference to Agency InterpretationsAfter EEOC v.
Aramco, 42 DUKE L.J. 166, 185 (1992) ("The reasonableness inquiry requires that an
agency simply present a coherent and rational interpretation of the statute to the court.").
17 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 137 (finding that the Corps' 1977 regulations
were "brought
to Congress' attention through legislation specifically designed to supplant it") (citations
omitted); see Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2231 (highlighting Congress' rejection of "a proposal
to 'limi[t] the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction to waters navigable in fact and their adjacent
wetlands"' (quoting Riverside, 474 U.S. at 136)).
78 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 137 ("[A] refusal by Congress to
overrule an agency's
construction of legislation is at least some evidence of the reasonableness of that
construction..."); see also Mark Squillace, From "Navigable Waters" to "Constitutional
Waters": The Future of Federal Wetlands Regulation, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 827
(2007) ("[Tlhe Court found the Corps' rules to be a reasonable interpretation of the
statute...").
79 See Squillace, supra note 78, at 133 (illustrating the term "navigable waters"
is
defined by the CWA as "waters of the United States"); see also Tyler Moore, Defining
"Waters of the U.S.". Canals,Ditches, and Drains, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39 (2004) (noting a
line of Supreme Court cases expanding the definition of "navigable waters" to those that
are "navigable in fact").
80 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 135 (holding that owner of wetland property abutting a
navigable waterway was within Corps' jurisdiction); see also Moore, supra note 79, at 3839 ("[E]ven non-tidal waters... are navigable waters.").
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F. The Growth of the Ecological Effects Test and the Migratory
Bird Rule
Riverside Bayview significantly affected CWA jurisdiction
because for the first time the Court validated the Corps'
authority to regulate wetlands and acknowledged that the Corps'
regulatory authority extended beyond the traditional navigablein-fact limitation. 1 Moreover, the Court validated the Corps'
ability to consider biological and ecological factors in its
jurisdictional
assessments.82
Specifically, the unanimous
Riverside Court stated that the Corps' "ecological judgment about
the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands
provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent
wetlands may be defined as waters under the [CWA]. ' 's8 The
Court's endorsement of the Corps' ecological judgment dealt a
considerable blow to private landowners and caused one
commentator to state that "if such ecological interconnection
comprises an acceptable test of whether wetlands are to be
regulated, every wetland lying within the flyways of migratory
birds would be included, which could well include every wetland
in the entire United States."8' 4
Following Riverside Bayview, in 1986 the Corps promulgated
the so-called "migratory bird rule"8 5 which sought to extend CWA
jurisdiction to any intrastate waters "[w]hich are or would be

8, See Randall S. Guttery, Stephen L. Poe & C.F. Sirmans, Federal Wetlands
Regulation: Restrictions On the Nationwide Permit Program and the Implications for
Residential Property Owners, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 299, 308 (2000) (arguing that the Court
endorsed the broad view of CWA jurisdiction promulgated in the Corps' 1977 regulations).
But see Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2229 (finding that Riverside held only that wetlands
directly abutting navigable-in-fact waters received CWA protection).
82 See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134-35 (noting that the Corps' recognition of hydrologic
connections, filtration properties of wetlands, biological functions of wetlands including
"nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic... species" and whether the
wetland in question functions as an integral unit of the local environment are all relevant
factors serving to justify CWA jurisdiction); see also Guttery et al., supra note 81, at 307
(observing that the Court in Riverside found biological and ecological factors to be
acceptable connections to navigable waterways).
83 See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134.
84 Guy V. Manning, Comment, The Extent of Groundwater Jurisdiction Under
the
Clean Water Act After Riverside Bayview Homes, 47 LA. L. REV. 859, 871 (1987).
85 See, e.g., SWANCC,
531 U.S. 159, 164 (2001); see Kim Diana Connolly, Keeping
Wetlands Wet: Are Existing Protections Enough?, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2004/2005)
(noting that the EPA and Corps believe that waters that may be used as habitat for
migratory birds are the types of waters that can affect commerce if allowed to be
destroyed).
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used as habitat" by migratory birds.8 6 Sure enough, Riverside
Bayview's broader interpretation of CWA jurisdiction played out
in 1990 when the Ninth Circuit upheld the migratory bird rule in
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States8 7 and again in 1993 when the
Seventh Circuit similarly accepted the migratory bird rule,
holding that "it is reasonable to interpret the regulation as
allowing migratory birds to be that [ecological] connection
between a wetland and interstate commerce."8 8 As a result of
Riverside's endorsement of the ecological effects test and the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits' validation of the migratory bird rule,
the new enlarged scope of the CWA increased the federal
regulatory burden on landowners and developers and raised
serious constitutional questions about the limits of federal
regulation. 9
G. SWANCC and the Death of the MigratoryBird Rule
In 2001, the Supreme Court, addressing the Corps'
interpretation of Section 404 of the CWA, issued a decision that
many hoped would squarely address the serious Commerce
Clause question raised by the migratory bird rule. 90 Failing to
86 See Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. 328.3 (2007)); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at
164 (stating that "Migratory Bird Rule" extended the Corps' jurisdiction to intrastate
waters).
87 Leslie Salt Co. v. U.S., 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990), remanded to 820 F. Sulo.
478 (N.D. Cal. 1992). aff'd, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995). "The commerce clause power, and
thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend the CorDs' iurisdiction to local
waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species." Id. at 360.
"[A]lthough prior to the Migratory Bird Rule the Corps could not have jurisdiction over
waters that were not either connected to or adjacent to interstate waters, this rule allows
potential jurisdiction over not only isolated, but completely intrastate, bodies of water if
migratory birds are present." Tanya M. White & Patrick R. Douglas, Note, Postponing the
Inevitable, The Supreme Court Avoids Deciding Whether the Migratory Bird Rule Passes
Commerce Clause Muster, 9 MO. ENVTL. L. POL'Y REV. 9, 11 (2001).
ss Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. E.P.A. 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993).
89 See Guttery et al., supra note 81, at 310 n.53 (opining that the Corps' use of the
migratory bird rule to support the assertion of an interstate nexus and thus the valid use
of the Commerce Power raised serious constitutional questions). See generally Bueschen,
supra note 41, at 955 (discussing how Riverside and its progeny appear to allow CWA
jurisdiction over remote wetlands with very little connection to interstate commerce).
90 Following the expansion of Corps' federal regulatory authority after Riverside and
the validation of the migratory bird rule by the lower courts, many interested parties,
specifically landowners, eagerly awaited for the Supreme Court to address the issue of
whether the migratory bird rule offended the Commerce Clause. When the Court squarely
addressed the validation of the migratory bird rule in SWANCC, it deliberately avoided
answering this constitutional question. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162. However, the
Court, in dicta, noted the lower court's holding which found the migratory bird rule to be
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reach the constitutional question, the Court, in Solid Waste
Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter
SWANCC), 9 ' by a 5-4 majority, invalidated the migratory bird
rule solely on statutory grounds, holding that the Corps' use of
the rule to extend jurisdiction to isolated intrastate waters
exceeded the authority it was granted under the CWA. 92 In
addressing whether the migratory bird rule was a proper
interpretation of the CWA, the Court explained that it had never
decided whether federal jurisdiction extended to isolated, nonnavigable, intrastate waters, and distinguished Riverside by
stating that "it was the significant nexus between the wetlands
and 'navigable waters' that informed our reading of the CWA in
Riverside Bayview Homes. 9 3 Next, the Court discussed the
a valid exercise of the commerce power under a substantial effects theory. Id. at 166. The
Court in U.S. v. Lopez held that Congress may exercise its commerce powers over (1)
channels of commerce, (2) instrumentalities of commerce, and (3) activities that
substantially affect commerce. 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). It seems that the SWANCC
Court's subsequent invalidation of the migratory bird rule on statutory interpretation
grounds implied that the substantial effects doctrine could not be relied upon with regard
to wetlands protection. Additionally, the Court noted that the respondents' reliance on a
substantial effects argument raised "significant constitutional questions" and as a result
of the potential to offend the Constitution, the "significant impingement" the Migratory
Bird Rule placed on states' rights and the CWA's express recognition to "preserve, and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States ... to plan the development
and use.., of land and water resources....", the Court would read the CWA in a way
that would avoid raising serious constitutional questions. 531 U.S. at 173-74. The postSWANCC confusion in the lower courts reflected the implicit acceptance that the
substantial effects justification for CWA jurisdiction had been invalidated by the Court in
SWANCC. The Fourth Circuit analyzed Congress' power to regulate the "channels of
interstate commerce" as a justification to regulate a tributary of a navigable water. See
U.S. v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 706-07 (4th Cir. 2003). A Wisconsin District court
interpreted the Deaton court's reluctance to use the substantial effects justification
because it could raise a serious constitution question and relying on SWANCC's
construction of the term "navigable" in the CWA to conclude that the Supreme Court
"ha[d] indicated that it believes that the [CWA] was enacted pursuant to Congress'
channels of commerce authority"). U.S. v. Thorson, 2004 WL 737522, at *17 (W.D. Wis.
2004) (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172).
" See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (explaining the Court's decision to avoid deciding
"significant constitutional and federalism questions"); see also Deaton, 332 F.3d at 705
(discussing the Court's decision in SWANCC to avoid addressing constitutional issues
when statutes can be interpreted as avoiding such problems while still comporting with
the plain intent of Congress in enacting the statute).
2 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174; see also FD&P Enters. Inc., v. U.S. Army Corps. Of
Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 513 (D.N.J. 2003) (noting that the Court's decision in
SWANCC limited the authority of Corp's under the CWA by rejecting the Migratory Bird
Rule, and since this time it has been difficult for courts to determine the reach of the

CWA).
9S See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166 (noting that the lower court addressed the
constitutional question of whether the Migratory Bird Rule offended the Commerce
Clause and determined that the "cumulative impact doctrine" permitted regulation of
intrastate activities such as isolated excavation ponds if the aggregate effect of that class
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legislative history and explained that even though Congress
stated that navigable waters should "be given the broadest
constitutional interpretation,"94 this did not signify its "[intent] to
95
exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation."
The Court further noted that even though Congress failed to
reject the Corp's expansive regulations in the 1977 debates, this
did not amount to Congress's acquiescence to the Corps' 1977
regulations because Congress did not specifically address the
question of federal jurisdiction over isolated, non-navigable,
intrastate waters. 96 Affirming the "limited import" language in
Riverside Bayview, 97 the Court concluded that Congress's
definition of navigable waters as "the waters of the United
States," while limiting the weight of the term navigable, did not
permit reading that term out of the statute. 98 As a result, the
Court found that the migratory bird rule, by conferring
jurisdiction over isolated waters, failed to acknowledge
Congress's express use of the term "navigable" in the CWA and

of activity substantially impacted interstate commerce) (citing Solid Waste Agency v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999)).
94 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3.
95

Id.

See id. at 170 (stating that "respondent point us to no persuasive evidence that the
House bill was proposed in response to the Corps' claim of jurisdiction over nonnavigable,
isolated, intrastate waters or that its failure indicated congressional acquiescence to such
jurisdiction"); see also Riverside, 474 U.S. at 137 (explaining that Congress' "refusal to
overrule an agency's an agency's construction of legislation is at least some evidence of
the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the administrative
construction has been brought to Congress' attention through legislation specifically
designed to supplant it."). But see SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Congress' deliberate rejection of cutting back on the Corps' expansive 1975
regulations in the 1977 debates expressly indicates congressional acquiescence to the
Corps' enlarged jurisdiction as recognized in Riverside).
9 See U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 123, 133 (1985) ("Although [the
Act] prohibits discharges into 'navigable waters,' the Act's definition of 'navigable waters'
as 'the waters of the United States' makes it clear that the term 'navigable' as used in the
Act is of limited import. In adopting this definition of 'navigable waters,' Congress
evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by
earlier water pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce
Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the
classical understanding of that term.") (citations omitted); see also Bueschen, supra note
41, at 936 (noting that the definition of "navigable waters" has been extended to include
isolated wetlands).
" See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133 ("[T]he term 'navigable' as used in the [CWA] is of
limited import."); see also FD&P Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp.
509, 513 (D.N.J. 2003) ('The term 'navigable' has at least the import of showing us what
Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction
over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so
made.").
9
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thus exceeded the scope of authority granted by the language of
the statute. 99
The SWANCC Court's strategic avoidance of the question
whether the Corps' regulations violated the Commerce Clause
came as a subtle disappointment to those interested in the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 10 0 As recently as 1995,
in United States v. Lopez,10 1 the Court had held that Congress's
commerce power extended to activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.1 0 2 After Lopez, the question whether nonnavigable, intrastate wetlands became proper objects of
regulation under a substantial effects theory concerned
environmentalists and landowners alike and became a potential
Clause
Commerce
evolving
into
the Court's
window
jurisprudence.1 0 3 An answer to that question would affect the
99 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-74 (finding municipal landfill used as habitat by
migratory birds "is a far cry, indeed, from the 'navigable waters' and 'waters of the U.S.' to
which the statute by its terms extends ... claim[ing] federal jurisdiction over ponds and
mudflats... would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and
primary power over land and water use"); see also FD&P Enters., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 513
(asserting that "the Migratory Bird Rule [in SWANCC] exceeded the authority granted to
the Corps under the CWA" and further specifying that 'navigable' has at least the import
of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its
traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could
reasonably be so made.").
1oo See Alexandra B. Mass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory
State, 92 IowA L. REV. 545, 578-79 (2007) (discussing SWANCCs avoidance of the
constitutional issue regarding environmental statutes and Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and declaring uncertainty as to "just how far the Court will go in reining in
federal authority to regulate natural resources and pollution on Commerce Clause or
other grounds in future cases. . . '); see also Paul Boudreaux, A New Clean Water Act, 37
ELR 10171, 10171 (2007) ("Instead of the problematic path of confronting the Commerce
Clause directly, the federalists on the Court resorted to an ingenious logical sequence...
By deciding the case through statutory interpretation, the Court avoided having to
resolve the thorny issue of the commerce power in relation to protecting wildlife.").
10' 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
102 Id.
at 559, 560 ("We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, that
the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially
affects' interstate commerce... Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating the activity will be sustained."); see also U.S. v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609-10 (2000) (highlighting Lopez's clarification of Congress'
commerce authority to regulate those activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce).
103 See Sam Saad, Commerce Clause Jurisprudence:Has There Been a Change?, 23 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 143, 165 (2003) (posing questions of environmental
regulation necessarily come under Lopez's substantial effects test, therefore creating
uncertainty as to "how that test affects Congress's ability to regulate the environment");
see also Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson:
Commerce Clause Jurisprudenceand the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL.
L. 1, 11 (1999) ('The explicit question to be addressed in most future Commerce Clause
cases is whether given activities - from the burning of homes and the filling of wetlands to
hazardous waste clean-up . . . - have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.").
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reach of the constitution and the balance
of regulatory power
10 4
between federal and state governments.
Addressing this issue, the Court noted its reluctance to reach
constitutional questions unless Congress clearly indicated its
intention to achieve a particular result.1 °5 In this case, it could
hardly be said that "the waters of the United States" spoke
directly to the validity of the Corps' migratory bird rule under the
Commerce Clause.10 6 Accordingly, the Court avoided answering
the constitutional question in favor of construing the language of
the CWA to fall short 10 of
conferring jurisdiction over the
7
excavation ponds at issue.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's
dismissal of Congress's unambiguous assertion that CWA
jurisdiction should
"be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation.' 08 Offering a detailed examination of the
104

See Adler, supra note 103, at 11-12 (discussing balance of power between state and

federal systems and explaining that future Commerce Clause cases will necessarily
address "the extent to which congressional enactments, and the subsequent edicts of
regulatory agencies, infringe upon the prerogatives of states governments to handle their
own affairs"); see also Jamie Y. Tanabe, Comment, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will
Federal Environmental Law Survive in Post-SWANCC Epoch of "New Federalism"?, 31
ENVTL. L. 1051, 1062 (2001) (examining effects on federal environmental regulation postLopez and highlighting potential widespread ramifications on federalist principles
through decisions on "what extent Congress will be able to continue to use its Commerce
Clause power to regulate the environment").
105 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 ("Where an administrative interpretation of a
statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that
Congress intended the result. This requirement stems from our prudential desire not to
needlessly reach constitutional issues. . . ');see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (stating courts will
construe statutes to avoid raising constitutional problems unless Congress clearly intends
otherwise because Congress is bound by oath; therefore "[t]he courts will ... not lightly
assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp
power constitutionally forbidden it").
'06 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (indicating it is unclear what object Corps is seeking
to regulate-the wetland or petitioner's municipal landfill); see also Jonathan Cannon,
Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363,
392 (2006) (discussing Corps' argument that the migratory bird rule covered "isolated
waters," constituted "waters of the U.S.," and properly conferred federal jurisdiction over
excavation pond).
107 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (holding the migratory bird rule "exceeds the
authority granted to respondents [Corps] under § 404(a) of the CWA"); see also Jonathan
H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental
Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 112 (2007) ("Specifically, the Court held that the
CWA does not confer federal regulatory jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters,
including isolated wetlands.").
108 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 181 ("The Court dismisses this clear assertion of legislative
intent with the back of its hand."); see J. Michael Bayes, New Limits on the Army Corps of
Engineers' Jurisdiction:The Court Throws the Migratory Bird Rule Overboard, 7 ENVTL.
LAw. 691, 721 (2001) (highlighting Justice Stevens' declaration in SWANCC, "the
provision's legislative history ...makes clear that Congress understood § 404(g)(1) - and
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legislative history of the CWA, Justice Stevens rejected the
majority's holding that "navigable" be given some importance. 10 9
Justice Stevens explained that Congress's express deletion of the
term "navigable" from the definition suggested by the 1971
House Report, coupled with the fact that the goals of the CWAnamely the protection of the "significant natural biological
functions, including food chain production, general habitat, and
nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for various species of
aquatic wildlife"-which have nothing to do with navigation,
indicate that Congress intended "navigable waters" to be
shorthand for "waters over which federal authority may properly
be asserted."1 10 Moreover, Justice Stevens noted that the 1977
congressional debates were initiated in response to the Corps'
expansive1975 revised statement of regulations and thus
Congress's rejection of a narrower definition of "waters"
demonstrated that it was fully aware of the scope of CWA
jurisdiction asserted by the Corps."
Justice Stevens then explained that the inclusion of section
404(g) in the 1977 amendments, which gave the states authority
under the CWA to administer dredge and fill permit programs
over non-navigable waters,11 2 indicated that Congress intended to
extend federal jurisdiction not only to non-navigable tributaries
but also to isolated waters.1 13 Specifically, the Corps' revised
statement of regulations in 1975 set forth three phases of
jurisdiction to be established in yearly succession starting in that

therefore federal jurisdiction - to extend, not only to navigable waters and nonnavigable
tributaries, but also to 'isolated' waters, such as those at issue in this case").
"'o9SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 180-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('The activities regulated by
the CWA have nothing to do with Congress' 'commerce power over navigation.' Indeed,
the goals of the 1972 statute have nothing to do with navigation at all.") (italics omitted).
110 Id. at 181-82.

111 Id. at 185-86 (suggesting that Congress endorsed the Corps' broad conception of
its jurisdiction by rejecting the 1977 House proposal to limit the Corps' jurisdiction under
§404 to navigable waters and their adjacent wetlands)
112 Id. at 188 (noting that under the new section states had optional jurisdiction
over
the discharge of dredge and fill material into certain "non-navigable waters," in the sense
that states could only regulate those waters not presently used, or susceptible to being
used, for the transport of interstate or foreign commerce (quoting § 404 (g)(1) of the 1977
amendments)); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (g)(1) (2007) (providing that states may
administer dredge or fill programs to navigable waters and adjacent wetlands with proper
authorization).
13
See id. at 189 ("Congress understood § 404(g)(1) - and therefore federal
jurisdiction - to extend, not only to navigable waters and non-navigable tributaries, but
also to 'isolated' waters, such as those at issue in this case.").
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year.11 4 Phase 1, which became effective in 1975, asserted
jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters. 1 15 Phase 2,
effective after July 1, 1976, extended CWA jurisdiction to nonnavigable tributaries. Finally, phase 3, effective after July 1,
other waters necessary "for the
1977, purported to cover 'all
16
quality."
water
of
protection
Congress, in promulgating section 404(g), stated in the
Conference Report that it intended the states to administer a
permit program "for the discharge of dredge and fill material into
phase 2 and phase 3 waters after the approval by the [EPA]
Administrator."'" 7 Accordingly, because phase 2 and phase 3
waters purport to cover such subjects as "intermittent rivers,
streams, tributaries, perched wetlands that are not contiguous or
adjacent to navigable waters," Congress's enactment of the 404(g)
program plainly established its desire to extend CWA jurisdiction
"beyond just navigable waters, their tributaries, and the
wetlands adjacent to each." 118 Further, section 404(g)'s explicit
effort to foster state control over phase 2 and phase 3 waters
"supplant federal
indicated that Congress intended the states' to
19
control with their own regulatory programs.""
Addressing the constitutionality of the migratory bird rule,
Justice Stevens noted that the rule did not raise any serious
constitutional questions with regard to Congress's Commerce
Clause authority. 20 Citing the Court's adoption of the so-called
114 See id. at 184 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 31325-31326 (1975)) (stating that new
regulations would become effective in three phases, beginning in 1975 and concluding in
1977); see also 42 Fed. Reg. 37,127 (July 19, 1977) (codifying the "migratory bird" rule,
which is an example of the regulations set forth in 1975).
11 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 184 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 40 Fed.
Reg. 31,325-31,326 (1975)) ("[P]hase 1, which became effective immediately, encompassed
the navigable waters covered by the 1974 regulation and the RHA...") (citing 40 Fed.
Reg. 31326 (1975)).
116 Id. (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 31326 (1975)).
117 See id. at 184. Phase 3 gave the Corps jurisdiction over all "navigable" waters,

which was defined by the 1975 regulations to include any waters that the District
Engineer determined needed to be regulated to ensure water quality, such as
"intermittent rivers, steams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are not contiguous or
adjacent to navigable waters." 40 Fed. Reg. 31325 (1975).
118 Id. at 189-90.
119Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Flournoy, supra note 7, at 618 (arguing
that the "claimed absence of federal constraints on land use may be a convenient myth
perpetuated in the hopes of bringing it to a reality.").
120 See Id. at 192-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that migratory bird rule was
within Congress' Commerce power to regulate activities that "substantially affect"

interstate commerce because decline of commercial activities associated with migratory

birds was direct); see also Patrick Parenteau, Bad Calls: How Corps' Districts are Making
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"substantial effects" doctrine,' 2 1 Justice Stevens argued that the
Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over migratory bird habitat easily
falls within Congress's commerce power because the discharge of
dredge and fill material into such habitat, on a cumulative level,
substantially affects interstate commerce. 122 Specifically, Justice
Stevens reasoned that the discharge of dredge and fill material is
"almost always undertaken for economic reasons" 123 and the
destruction of a wide range of migratory bird habitat, in the
aggregate, will have a substantial effect on migratory bird
populations resulting in an economic decline 1in
a "host of
24
birds.
these
with
associated
activities"
commercial
H. Post SWANCC Confusion
The federal judiciary's response to the SWANCC decision
125
exhibited differing characterizations of the SWANCC holding.
Some courts narrowly interpreted SWANCC to only invalidate
Up Their Own Rules of Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 17
(2004/2005) (discussing the bases for Clean Water Act jurisdiction).
121 The substantial effects doctrine permits federal jurisdiction to cover individual,
intrastate, economic activities having only a trivial effect on interstate commerce when
the cumulative effect of "all other[s] similarly situated is far from trivial." See, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942). In this case, the Supreme Court upheld a
criminal statute and further articulated the aggregation principle, finding that Congress
could use its power to regulate an activity even if the particular intrastate activity has no
effect on interstate commerce. As long as the regulated activity (considered as a class of
activities) has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and the affected party is a
member of the class regulated, the regulation is a valid use of congressional commerce
power. See Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
122 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 192-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In addition to the
intrinsic value of migratory birds ... it is undisputed that literally millions of people
regularly participate in birdwatching and hunting and that those activities generate a
host of commercial activities of great value.").
123 See id. at 193.
124 See id. at 194-95 (illustrating the commercial activities associated with migratory
bird habitat include bird-watching and hunting as well as crop production); see also
Thomas L. Casey, Reevaluating "Isolated Waters" Is Hydrologically Connected
Groundwater "Navigable Water" Under the Clean Air Act?, 54 ALA. L. REV. 159, 173-74
(2002) (concluding that SWANCC reaffirmed much of what the Court earlier held in
Riverside, that the "substantial nexus" test annunciated by the Court in SWANCC is
nothing more than a clarification of the standard first established in Riverside for
determining the scope of "waters of the U.S." under the Act).
125 See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 85, at 27-29 (outlining the jurisdictional issues
surrounding the post.SWANCC jurisprudence); see also Adler, supra note 110, at 112-13
("A study by the General Accounting Office found that Army Corps district offices'
jurisdictional determinations varied significantly after SWANCC. In the courts, a circuit
split soon developed on the scope of the holding. Most circuits adopted a fairly narrow
reading of SWANCC, though the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted
SWANCC to impose potentially significant limits on federal regulatory authority under
the CWA.").
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the migratory bird rule.1 26 These courts tended to preserve CWA
jurisdiction over some isolated, non-navigable, intrastate, waters
if a nexus to navigable waters, other than migratory bird habitat,
could be shown.12 7 Other courts broadly interpreted SWANCC
not only to invalidate the migratory bird rule, but also to
invalidate any attempt to assert jurisdiction over isolated, nonnavigable, intrastate waters. 128 These courts tended to preclude
CWA jurisdiction unless a "direct and non-tenuous linkage" to a
navigable-in-fact waterway was shown. 129
126 See. e.z.. U.S. v. Interstate Gen. Co., 39 Fed. Apox. 870, 874 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding
that "[ilnsum, SWANCC's holding addressed only the validity of rthe migratorv bird
rulel): see also Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist.. 243 F.3d 526. 533 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding nonnavigable irrigation canals "waters of the U.S." and finding that
SWANCC only invalidated the migratorv bird rule): U.S. v. Budav, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282.
1293 (D. Mont. 2001) (stating that the SWANCC Court struck the migratory bird rule's
"clarification" and its application as exceeding Congress' intent ... because it premised
Congress' power on the effects that a water body could have on interstate commerce, and
that the case at issue did not concern the Migratory Bird Rule).
127 See Stephen A. Gibbons, Comment, Just Because You Say It, Doesn't Make It So:
What Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Really Says, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 53 (2003) (positing that the courts narrowly
interpreting SWANCC to only invalidate the migratory bird rule interpreted the
significant nexus language to mean "any nexus" even if it was based on an "indirect
hydrologic connection"); Lawrence R. Liebesman & Stuart Turner, Summary of Federal
Court Decisions Interpreting the Supreme Court's 2001 Decision in SWANCC, A.L.I.A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 29, at 31 (May 28-30,
2003), available at WESTLAW SH088 ALI-ABA 29 ("[C]ourts have read the decision
narrowly, interpreting it as merely invalidating a controversial 1986 regulation allowing
the Corps to assert jurisdiction over isolated wetlands based on their use by migratory
birds.").
128 See, e.g., Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir.
2001)
(interpreting SWANCC broadly to hold that CWA jurisdiction only extends to navigablein-fact bodies of water or wetlands adjacent thereto); see also FD&P Enters. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp.2d 509, 516 (D.N.J. 2003) (rejecting the "hydrologic
connection" test and adopting the "significant nexus" test thus reading SWANCC broadly
in order to reject CWA jurisdiction over isolated waters); U.S. v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d
1011, 1015-16 (E.D. Mich. 2002) [hereinafter Rapanos 1) (citing SWANCC's language at
531 U.S. at 172 finding that CWA jurisdiction must be predicated on a showing of a
substantial effect on navigable-in-fact waters).
129 See Rapanos I, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16 (stating that CWA jurisdiction over
wetlands require that the wetlands 'were or had been navigable in fact or which
reasonably could be made so"' (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172)); Rice, 250 F.3d at 269
(holding that "a body of water is subject to regulation under the CWA if the body of water
is actually navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water"); FD&P Enters.,
239 F. Supp.2d at 516 (declaring that a "significant nexus" with navigable waters was
necessary to establish CWA jurisdiction); US v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780, 786-86
(E.D. Va. 2002) (ruling that CWA jurisdiction applies only to waters 'that were or had
been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be made so"' (quoting SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 172)); U.S. v. Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751, 767-68 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(finding that CWA jurisdiction only applies to wetlands if the wetlands are contiguous or
adjacent to navigable waters), rev'd 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003); Gibbons, supra note 127,
at 52 (explaining that, subsequent to SWANCC, courts found CWA jurisdiction existed if
the wetland bore a significant nexus to navigable waters).

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:1

The post-SWANCC disagreement exhibited by the lower courts
hinged on the interpretation of the "significant nexus"
requirement articulated by the Court.13 Without a clearly
defined standard for the "significant nexus" requirement, courts
were free to apply their own interpretation of the term. 13' Thus, a
major problem with SWANCC was its failure to speak to whether
a mere hydrologic connection was sufficient to give rise to a
"significant nexus" or whether adjacent wetlands require direct
abutment to navigable waters.13 2 Additionally, the issue of
groundwater was never addressed in SWANCC, leaving courts
dumbfounded when faced with cases exhibiting a lack of a
surface connection but having a substantial groundwater
connection. 33 Despite the difficulty of interpreting the SWANCC
holding, the ruling initiated a shift in regulatory power from the
federal government to the states.1 34 Following the decision, some
130 See, e.g., FD&P Enters, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (weighing conflicting judicial
interpretations of the significant nexus requirement); Jeremy A. Colby, SWANCC: Full
Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing... Much?, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1017, 1031
(2004) ("SWANCC, however, has generated much litigation over the meaning of...
'significant nexus."').
131 Compare Rice, 250 F.3d at 269 (interpreting SWANNC to mean that a body of
water is under CWA jurisdiction "if the body of water is actually navigable or is adjacent
to an open body of navigable water" (citing SWANCC at 680)), with Headwaters, 243 F.3d
at 533 (reasoning that SWANCC enables CWA jurisdiction to include canals that "are
connected as tributaries to other 'waters of the U.S."').
132 In Rapanos, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion held that SWANCC established that
CWA jurisdiction extends to navigable waters and wetlands that directly abut such
waters. Rapanos v. U.S.,126 S. Ct 2208, 2217 (2006). Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion argued that CWA jurisdiction extends to all waters having a "significant nexus" to
navigable waters, taking into account biologic, ecologic and hydrologic considerations. Id.
at 2248. Finally, Justice Stevens' dissent maintained that any nexus implicating
downstream water quality issues is sufficient to establish CWA jurisdiction. Id. at 2264.
Thus, the SWANCC Court's vagueness allows courts a wide range in which to establish
jurisdiction and consequently allows significantly disparate levels of wetland regulation
and protection. See Brandon A. Van Balen, Note, Clearing The Muddy Waters?: An
Examination of SWANCC And The Implication for Wetlands Protection And The
Administrative State, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV 845, 865-66 (2001).
133 See, e.g., U.S. v. Newdunn, 344 F.3d 407, 411 (4th Cir. 2003) (correcting lower a
court's ruling for confusing SWANCC's meaning when defining jurisdictional wetlands);
see also Brian Knutsen, Asserting Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Over Isolated Waters:
What Happens After the SWANCC Decision, 10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 155, 181-82
(2005) ("Since the Supreme Court's ruling in SWANCC ...[t]he question still remains as
to exactly what sort of link will suffice for [CWA jurisdiction]. At least two connections to
so-called 'isolated waters' may provide the 'significant nexus' that the Court in SWANCC
deemed so crucial. First, the fact that these isolated waters play an important role in
providing for flood control over navigable waters may attach CWA jurisdiction. Second, a
showing of a groundwater connection between the 'isolated water' and a navigable body of
water may provide a jurisdictional basis.").
134 See Rapanos , 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (characterizing SWANCC as at the very
least to hold that "isolated" waters were not covered by the CWA, thus creating a
"significant shift" in CWA jurisdiction from federal to state authority); see also Colby,
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commentators argued that thirty to sixty percent of the nation's
wetlands became subject to destruction by unsupervised private
development. 135 In South Carolina for example, over 200
wetlands previously covered by the CWA were declared too
13
isolated after SWANCC. 6
In response to the SWANCC decision, the Corps and the EPA
initiated a proposed rulemaking to specifically address the extent
of Corps' jurisdiction over isolated waters as defined by 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3).1 37 Under this definition of "waters," the Corps
asserted jurisdiction over "other waters" including intrastate
waters, wetlands, prairie potholes,
mudflats, and wet
meadows. 138 Many commentators believed SWANCC invalidated
the Corps' definition of "other waters" promulgated under 33
C.F.R. § 328.(a)(3). 139 After initially considering revising the
supra note 130, at 1032 (positing that the shift in regulatory power from the federal
government to the states is one plausible reading of SWANCC, but indicating that under
another fair interpretation of the case, SWANCC only invalidated the migratory bird rule
and thus still permits the Corps to regulate intrastate waters with a minimal hydrologic
connections); Johnston, supra note 31, at 337 (claiming that "[b]y invalidating the
Migratory Bird Rule as an unauthorized extension of the Corps' powers under the CWA,
the Supreme Court made an important shift in the balance of regulatory power between
the federal and state governments with respect to environmental issues").
135 See Johnston, supra note 31, at 355 (deducing that "[a]s a result [of SWANCCs
shift if regulatory power], thirty to sixty percent of our nation's wetlands are not at risk of
potentially unsupervised development" (citing JON KUSLER, ASS'N. OF STATE WETLAND
MGRS., INC., THE SWANCC DECISION AND STATE REGULATIONS OF WETLANDS 1 (2001),

available at http://www.aswm.org/swancc/aswm-int.pdf));
RiverKeeper.org, Federal
Rollbacks: The SWANCC Decision and Bush Administration Attacks on Clean Water Act,
http://riverkeeper.org/campaign.php/watershedlyou-can do442 (last visited Sept. 19,
2007) (warning that since SWANCC, "[flederal protections could have been lost for more
than sixty percent of the combined watershed areas [in the northeast alone]").
136See Robert J. Alberts, The Fate of Wetlands After Rapanos/Carabell:Fortuitous or
Folly?, 35 REAL EST. L.J. i, 1 (2006) ("In the wake of [SWANCC], thousands of acres
formerly under the Corps' jurisdiction were relegated to the jurisdiction of the states. In
South Carolina alone, 237 wetlands were declared too isolated to fall under federal
control."); Sammy Fretwell, State Enacts Emergency Wetlands Protection, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 9, 2001, at B3 (informing that SWANCCs ruling has left "[a]bout
453,000 acres of wetlands ...at risk in South Carolina").
137 Compare 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(3) (listing the meaning of "waters
of the U.S."), with
68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (2003) (reporting that the Corps' and EPA is seeking proposed
rulemaking to conclusively define the extent of CWA jurisdiction given under 33 C.F.R.
328.3(a)(3)).
138 See 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(3) (defining "waters of the U.S." to mean "[aill other waters
such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams, mudflats,
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds")); see also 68 F.R. 1991 (2003) (noting that the Corp's and EPA are proposing
rulemaking to conclusively define the extent of CWA jurisdiction given under 33 C.F.R.
328.3(a)(3)).
139 See, e.g., Knutsen, supra note 133, at 175 ("The majority of courts addressing
the
issue of CWA jurisdiction over 'isolated' waters since the SWANCC opinion have found,
and this article argues, that the entirety of 328.3(a)(3) is no longer valid."); see also
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regulation, the EPA and the Corps decided to leave the
regulation
unchanged.140
Thus, following SWANCC, no
affirmative legislative changes were made to the Corps' prior

regulations. 141
II. RAPANOS-THE CASE IN THE MIDDLE
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided yet another wetlands case,
Rapanos v. United States.142 The Rapanos case can be
characterized as occupying a middle ground between Riverside
and SWANCC. 14 3 In Riverside, a unanimous Supreme Court
upheld jurisdiction over wetlands that directly abutted a
navigable creek. 4 4 In SWANCC, the Court, by a 5-4 majority,
struck down jurisdiction over physically isolated excavation
ponds. 1 45 In Rapanos, the Court addressed wetlands directly
abutting tributaries of navigable waters.1 46 Factually and legally,
Jennifer DeButts Cantrell, Note, For the Birds: The Statutory Limits of the Army Corps of
Engineers'Authority Over Intrastate Waters After SWANCC, 77 S.CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1380
(2004) (inferring invalidation of entire 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(3) from Court's holding in
SWANCC).
140 See Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Roberts, CJ., concurring)
(explaining that the proposed rulemaking did not result in the Corps taking any action to
change the federal regulation after SWANCC); see also Felicity Barringer, In Reversal,
EPA Won't Narrow Wetlands Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at A35 (announcing
EPA reversal of plans to narrow scope of Clean Water Act).
141 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (noting that the Corps failed to clarify the scope of
its power after SWANCC); see also Charlotte S. Garvey, Committee Chair Offers Wetlands
Bill, ROCK PRODUCTS, Jun. 2007, at 4 (reporting new legislation proposed in Congress to
clarify scope of Clean Water Act).
142 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); see Laurence E. Rosoff and Louise Ambrose, Rapanos
Navigable Waters, and Wetlands, THE PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER, July 2007, at 5152 (discussing decision made by Supreme Court regarding "navigable waters" as defined
in Clean Water Act).
143 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2240-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the
framework established by Riverside and SWANCC as laying the foundation to ask the
question whether Rapanos "constitute[s] a reasonable interpretation of 'navigable waters'
as in Riverside ...or an invalid construction as in SWANCC'); see also Bill Currie, Note,
Opening the Floodgates: The Roberts Court's Decision in Rapanos v. U.S. Spells Trouble
for the Future of the Waters of the U.S., 18 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 226-227 (2007)
(referring to SWANCC and Riverside as opposing cases in critique of Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion).
144 See U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124-26 (1985) (recounting
facts and procedural history of Riverside); see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2000)
("[TIn [Riverside] we held that the Corps had §404(a) jurisdiction over wetlands that
actually abutted on a navigable waterway.").
141 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 163, 171; see also Lyle Denniston, Justices Curb
Wetlands Protection; 5-4 Ruling Limits Federal Clean Water Act Refuges, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 10, 2001, at A7 (reporting split-decision made in SWANCC).
146 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2219 (characterizing the four wetlands at issue as lying
"near ditches or man-made drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable
waters ....
");id. at 2253-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (establishing that the three
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the Rapanos wetlands occupy a middle ground because they are
not readily characterized as directly abutting nor can they be
characterized as physically isolated. 147 Thus, Riverside and
SWANCC establish the framework to determine whether the
Rapanos wetlands fall within the ambit of "the waters of the
United States.' 48
In an attempt to harmonize the Riverside and SWANCC
holdings and to set forth the rule of law regarding the scope of
CWA jurisdiction, the Rapanos Court rendered a fractured 4-14149 decision in which no opinion commanded a majority. 150 This
Note will thoroughly examine the various arguments in the case
and propose that the Army Corps of Engineers and the lower
courts are free to apply the standard articulated in either the
plurality or the concurring opinion.
A. Facts
In Rapanos, the Court addressed whether CWA jurisdiction
covered four different wetlands: three having continuous surfacewater connections to navigable waters and one separated from a
tributary by a four-foot-wide man-made berm. 151 John Rapanos
wetlands parcels associated with John Rapanos each exhibited surface water connections
to tributaries of navigable waters and the fourth wetland at issue-the Carabell parcelabutted a man-made ditch flowing approximately one-mile to Lake St. Clair-a navigable
lake).
147 Id. at 2241 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that nexus between wetlands and
navigable waters must be significant); Ralph Tinner, Technical Aspect of Wetlands:
Wetland Definitions and Classifications in the U.S., U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
Mar. 7, 1997, http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/definitions.html (defining and
classifying wetlands both in regulatory and non-regulatory contexts).
84Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2241.
149 4-1-4 refers to the four Justice plurality consisting of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Alito and Thomas, the solo concurrence authored by Justice Kennedy and
the four Justice dissent consisting of Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg. See
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208. While the Supreme Court sought to resolve a deep
controversy concerning the Corp's jurisdiction under the CWA, the Court "fractured into
four-to-one-to-four blocs." See Bradford C. Mank, Implementing Rapanos-Will Justice
Kennedy's Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts,
Regulators, and Developers?, 40 IND. L. REV. 291, 292 (2007).
"0 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("It is unfortunate that no
opinion commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to read Congress's limits on
the reach of the Clean Water Act."); see Taylor Romigh, Comment, The Bright Line of
Rapanos:Analyzing The Plurality's Two-Part Test, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3295, 3296 (2007)
(stating that the plurality opinion in Rapanos "failed to advance a standard to govern in
future challenges").
'-" See 126 S. Ct. at 2253-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that wetlands
adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters are within the jurisdiction of CWA); see also
Heather Keith, Comment, U.S. v. Rapanos: Is 'Waters of the U.S. " Necessary for Clean
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owned the first three parcels at issue, and Keith and June
Carabell owned the fourth parcel. 5 2 The first parcel, known as
the Salzburg Site, contained 28 acres of wetlands whose waters
flowed directly into the Hoppler Drain, which spilled into
Hoppler Creek, which in turn flowed into the navigable
Kawkawlin River. 153 The second parcel, known as the Hines Road
site, contained 64 acres of wetlands with a surface water
connection to the Rose Drain, which flowed into the navigable
Tittabawassee River. 54 The third parcel, the Pine River site,
contained 49 acres of wetlands with a surface water connection to
the Pine River, which flowed into Lake Huron. 15 5 The fourth
parcel, the Carabell wetlands, consisted of approximately 16
acres of wetlands separated from the continuously flowing
Sutherland-Oemig Drain by a four-foot-wide man-made berm
that blocked surface water flow between the wetlands and the
drain. 156 The Sutherland-Oemig Drain emptied into Auvase
Creek, which
flowed one mile into Lake St. Clair, a 430 square
1 57
mile lake.
B. ProceduralHistory
The four distinct wetlands at issue in Rapanos were the
subjects of two different cases before the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 158 In the first case, United States v. Rapanos,159 the
Sixth Circuit held that the CWA covered John Rapanos' three
wetlands based on the "hydrological connection" between all
three wetlands and navigable waters. 160 Similarly, in Carabell v.
Water Act Jurisdiction,3 SETON HALL CiR. REV. 565, 595 (2007) (concluding that Rapanos'
three wetland sites connect to navigable rivers, and that Carabell's site runs along side of
a man-made ditch, separated by a "four-foot wide man-made berm").
152 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct at 2238-39. Specifically, John Rapanos owned the Salzburg site
and a company he controlled owned the Hines Road site. John Rapanos' wife and a
company she controlled owned the Pine River site. Id.
153 Id. at 2238.
154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Id. at 2239.

157 Id. at 2239.

15" See
U.S. v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing the
government's claims against Rapanos); Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d
704, 707 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing Carabell's claim against the government).
159 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003).
160 Id. at 453 (stating that Rapanos' wetlands were within jurisdiction of CWA because
they were adjacent to drain via hydrological connection).
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United States Army Corps of Engineers,16 1 the Sixth Circuit held
that the Southerland-Oemig drain constituted a tributary of a
navigable waterway and the wetland at issue exhibited a
"significant nexus" with navigable waters because of its
adjacency to the drain and the
"hydrological connection" between
16 2
the drain and Lake St. Clair.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper
interpretation of the CWA's phrase "the waters of the United
States" and to determine whether the Sixth Circuit applied the
correct standard. 163 The Court issued a fractured decision
consisting of a plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia and
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas, a
concurring opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, and a
dissenting opinion authored by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg. 164 Both the plurality's and
Justice Kennedy's opinion remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit
for different reasons. 1 65 The plurality articulated a "physical
connection" test,166 whereas Justice Kennedy's rationale
promoted a "significant nexus" test. 16 7 As a result of these
differing standards and the lack of a controlling opinion, it is
68
unclear how the lower courts should apply the case.1

391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 710 (noting that wetlands were within jurisdiction of CWA because nexus
between wetlands and "navigable waters" was significant).
163 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220 (stating that certiorari was granted to determine
whether wetlands at issue constituted "waters of the U.S." and to review constitutionality
of Act).
164 Id. at 2214, 2235, 2252 (noting composition of the 4-1-4 fractured decision); see also
Hopper, supra note 6, at 52-53 (describing the Court's voting distribution).
165 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2235 (stating that Sixth Circuit applied wrong standard to
determine whether wetlands were within scope of CWA jurisdiction); id. at 2252
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (concurring with decision but asserting that "significant nexus"
test should be applied to determine scope of CWA's jurisdiction).
166 Id. at 2232 n.13 (characterizing the plurality's standard as a "physical-connection
requirement").
167 See Hopper, supra note 6, at 53 (characterizing the plurality's standard as a
"hydrographic test").
166 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining that no
opinion in Rapanos is obviously controlling); see COPELAND supra note 1 (stating that the
lower courts will have to "wrestle" with the proper rule of decision to extract from
Rapanos).
161
162
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C. Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion set forth two important holdings that
deal with the scope of CWA jurisdiction and the scope of the
Corps' regulations. 169 Specifically, the questions the plurality
asked and answered were: (1) what is the definition of "the
waters of the United States;" and (2) in what circumstances may
wetlands be defined as "waters"?170 Basing its opinion largely on
a dictionary definition of "waters,"'' 71 the plurality held that
under the CWA the "waters of the United States" includes only
those "relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing
bodies of water 'forming geographic features' that are described
in ordinary parlance as 'streams, oceans, rivers and lakes'.' 7 2
The plurality also stated that "the phrase does not include
channels through which water flows intermittently or
ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for
rainfall."' 73 Scattered throughout the opinion, the plurality listed
other lands and waters it would exclude from CWA jurisdiction
including non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters; dry arroyos;
coulees and washes; wet meadows; storm sewers and culverts;
drain tiles; man-made drainage ditches; point sources such as
pipes, ditches channels
and conduits; directional sheet flow; and
1 74
100 year flood plains.

169

See U.S. v. Moses, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18483, at *16 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that

one of the plurality's requirements for "waters" to be included in the phrase "the waters of
the U.S." was that the water had to either have "permanent standing" or "continuous flow
at least for a period of 'some months"'); see also S.F. Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Division,
481 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 2007) (commenting that the decision in Rapanos dealt with
the "scope of the Corps' authority to regulate adjacent wetlands").
170 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18615, at *14-16
(9th Cir. 2007) (illustrating that whether a saturated land feature is to be included in the
term "waters" was addressed differently by the various opinions in Rapanos); Moses, 2007
U.S. App. Lexis 18483, at *13-15 (commenting that the plurality, the concurring, and the
dissenting opinions in Rapanos each had a different "definitional statement" to describe
what geographic feature can be considered "waters").
171 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220-23, 2225 (citing Webster's New International
Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954)).
172 Id. at 2242 (deriving this holding directly from Webster's Dictionary which defines
"waters" as a substance 'found in streams and bodies forming geographical features such
as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,' or 'the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods,
making up such streams or bodies"').
173 Id. at 2225.
174 Id.
at 2217-23 (stating that such waters were not within CWA's jurisdiction
because they were not continuously flowing or relatively permanent bodies of water);
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001) (noting that "Congress' decision in 1977" exempted
specific categories of discharges, such as "discharge of dredged or fill material ... for the
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The plurality's adversity to intermittent and ephemeral
streams is apparent by its criticism of various lower court
judgments that have relied on intermittent "waters" to establish
a hydrologic connection.1 75 Supporting its premise that "waters"
only include "relatively permanent," not intermittent flows, the
plurality argued that by defining "point source" separately from
"navigable waters" in Section 502176 the CWA expressly
categorizes certain "channels and conduits" that "typically carry
intermittent flows" as separate and distinct entities. 77 Therefore,
by negative inference, the discrete classification of certain point
sources typically carrying intermittent flows, indicates that
Congress intended to exclude such watercourses from the scope
of "the waters of the United States.1 7 8
Attempting to answer the question of what circumstances
permit the Corps to exercise authority, the plurality held that
"only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to ...
'waters of the United States' . so that there is no clear
demarcation between 'waters' and wetlands [may be deemed]
'adjacent to' such waters and covered by the [CWA]. 179 The
wetland must be "as a practical matter, indistinguishable" from a
"relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing body of
water."' 8 0 Thus, in sum, the test becomes (1) whether the water
purpose of construction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation ditches, or the
maintenance of drainage ditches").
175 See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (characterizing that case, which
predicated jurisdiction on an intermittent hydrologic connection, as an example of a
"sweeping assertion of jurisdiction" (citing Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., 344 F.3d 407, 410
(4th Cir. 2003))). But see Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534
(9th Cir. 2001) (positing that canals that are prevented from "exchanging" water with
streams or lakes and tributaries that intermittently flow are "waters of the U.S.").
176 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2007) (describing navigable waters as "waters of the U.S.,
including the territorial seas"); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2007) (defining point source
as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged.").
177 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2223 (suggesting that ditches, channels, and conduits are
separately classified to illustrate that "these are, by and large, not 'waters of the U.S."');
U.S. v. Sea Bay Dev. Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29059, at *7-8 (E.D. Va. 2007) (stating
that the plurality in Rapanos held that "ditches, channels, conduits carrying an
intermittent flow of water" do not constitute "waters of the U.S.").
178 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2223 (highlighting that point sources and navigable waters
are "separate and distinct categories").
179 Id. at 2226.
'80Id. at 2225-34; see Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y v. Metacon Gun Club, 472 F. Supp.
2d 219, 224 (D. Conn. 2007) (citing Army Corps regulations that define "wetlands" and
"adjacent").
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in question is a "relatively permanent body of water, connected to
traditional interstate navigable waters"; and (2) whether the
"wetland has a continuous surface connection with such a
waterway, making it difficult
to determine where the 'water' ends
' 18
and the 'wetland' begins."
The plurality vacated the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in both cases noting the "paucity" of factual evidence by
which to apply the
new standard-remanding the case for
82
further fact finding.'
D. Justice Kennedy's Lone Concurrence
Justice Kennedy concurred in the plurality's judgment to
remand both cases to the Sixth Circuit however he set forth a
different standard for determining federal jurisdiction. First, he
acknowledged
the traditional navigable-in-fact definition of
"waters'' 83 and then explained under what circumstances "other
waters" may fall into the field of "waters" as traditionally
defined.18 4 Specifically, Justice Kennedy found that "the Corps'
jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a
significant nexus between the wetlands in question and

181 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236-37.
182 Id. at 2235; see Simbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 at 224 (D. Conn.
2007 (noting the plurality's decision to vacate and remand).
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2237 (defining the "traditional understanding" of the term
(citing U.S. v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 406-08 (1940); The Daniel Ball,
10 Wall. 557, 563-64 (1871))); see id. at 2248 (describing the need to give the statutory
term "navigable "some meaning").
1s4 See id. at 2240-41 (stating under certain circumstances wetlands may be
considered "other waters" that fall under CWA jurisdiction however the issue is what
those circumstances are. According to Justice Kennedy, the Riverside Court held that the
Corps could permissibly rely on "ecological judgment" to determine that wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters are covered by the CWA. However, he noted that the
question of the Corps' authority over other wetlands not adjacent to navigable waters was
left open. Citing SWANCC, Justice Kennedy highlighted the isolated nature of the
excavation ponds in that case in order to illustrate the difference between adjacent
wetlands and non-adjacent, isolated waters. This difference represents the void in which
the Rapanos Court attempted to draw the line of CWA jurisdiction.); id. at 2241 (showing
on the one hand there are circumstances where "the connection between a nonnavigable
water or wetland and a navigable water may be so close, or potentially so close, that the
Corps may deem the water or wetland a 'navigable water' under the Act. In other
instances, as exemplified by SWANCC, there may be little or no connection." Thus, the
major question is where to draw the line and how to determine the significance of placing
the line at a particular spot.); see SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001) (finding that the
term "other waters" as used in § 404(g) of the CWA refers to those waters that are covered
by the CWA but are not navigable waters in the traditional sense.).
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navigable waters in the traditional sense.' 8 5 He defined
"significant nexus" vaguely by stating that "wetlands possess [it
if,] either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in
the region, [they] significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of other covered waters more readily
understood as 'navigable'.' ' 6 He acknowledged the importance of
such factors as ecological interconnections,'8 7 volume and
regularity of flow,' 8 8 proximity,' 8 9 and "other relevant
considerations"'' 90 in determining whether a particular parcel
exhibits the requisite significant nexus. Furthermore, he held
that wetlands adjacent to open waters' 9' might be categorically
defined as possessing a significant nexus,1 92 but that adjacency of
93
tributaries to navigable waters requires a case-by-case inquiry.'
nexus requirement,
185 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (explaining the significant
according to Justice Kennedy, eliminates the ambiguity that arises with regard nonadjacent wetlands that are not completely isolated from navigable waters. Thus, where a
wetland is found to be non-adjacent to an open body of water the Court should look to
whether there is a significant nexus between the wetland in question and a nearby
navigable body of water. In this way, the Corps is required to acknowledge both the
language of the CWA-the term "navigable"-and the purpose of the CWA-to protect
downstream water quality.); see id. at 2246 (showing additionally, such a significant
nexus assures that no constitutional question arises with regard to the commerce power
since a significant nexus between a wetland and a navigable water implies that similarly
situated wetlands would have a significant affect on navigable waters and thus interstate
commerce).
'" Id. at 2248 (defining the "significant nexus" requirement in terms of the purpose of
the CWA); see id. at 2250 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the beneficial effects
wetlands have on local aquatic ecosystems by providing "'habitat, sediment trapping,
nutrient recycling and flood peak diminution"').
187 Id. at 2244 (citing Riverside's recognition of wetlands' significant effect on water
quality and aquatic ecosystems).
'88Id. at 2248-49. Justice Kennedy noted that Riverside established categorical
jurisdiction over wetlands directly abutting open bodies of water and that the Corps may
draft guidelines that categorize tributaries significant enough that their adjacent
wetlands, in the majority of cases, will significantly affect the nearby aquatic ecosystem
connected to navigable waters. Such factors as volume and regularity of flow may be used
to categorize such tributaries. Id.
189 Id. at 2248 (stating proximity to navigable waters is a factor that may be used by
the Corps to categorize the tributary as significant).
'go Id.
191 See id. at 2238 (acknowledging the Corps' definition of adjacent in 33 C.F.R. §

328.3(c) as "bordering, contiguous or neighboring'). But see id. at 2226 n.10 (arguing that
adjacency cannot be defined as forming the border of or in "reasonable proximity" to but
rather may only be categorically defined as actually-abutting so as to implicate the
boundary-drawing problem in Riverside).
112 Id. at 2248 (relying on Riverside Bayview to support the proposition that "the
assertion of jurisdiction for. . . wetlands is sustainable under the Act by showing
adjacency alone").
193 Id. (explaining that the dissent's reliance on "ecological functions" to justify
categorizing all 'non-isolated wetlands"' as covered under the Act takes the Riverside
holding too far and as a result a fact-sensitive, case-by-case inquiry is most appropriate).
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Justice Kennedy established that a fact-sensitive, case-by-case
inquiry by the Corps is necessary to avoid overbroad and
nexus
the
significant
of
interpretations
unreasonable
identify
must
court
reviewing
"a
Moreover,
requirement.194
substantial evidence supporting the Corps' claims"'195 and "a mere
hydrologic connection should not suffice in all cases; the
connection may be too insubstantial for the hydrologic linkage to
establish the required 196nexus with navigable waters as
traditionally understood."
E. The Stevens Dissent
Criticizing the plurality's lack of respect for the Corps.'
discretion, 197 Justice Stevens argued that the Corps should be
afforded complete deference to categorically regulate wetlands
adjacent to tributaries. 98 Relying on the Court's "unanimous
opinion in Riverside Bayview"'199 and Congress's implied
acquiescence to the Corps.' expansive 1977 regulations,2 °° Justice
194

Id. at 2249 (noting that once a nexus is established, it may be acceptable to assume

covered status for other analogous wetlands located in the same region).
'95 Id. at 2251.
196 Id.
197 See id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that "technical and complex"
nature of wetlands ecology coupled with the Corps' thirty year practice of defining CWA
jurisdiction requires the Court to defer to the Corps' discretion); see also Jonathan H.
Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos:Revisiting 'Waters of the U.S." and the Limits of Federal
Wetland Regulation 14 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 10-11 (2006) (describing deference
dissent in Rapanos would grant to Army Corps as "near absolute" in terms of constructing
its own jurisdiction under CWA).
199 "Riverside Bayview made clear that jurisdiction does not depend on a wetland-bywetland inquiry. Instead, it is enough that wetlands adjacent to tributaries generally
have a significant nexus to the watershed's water quality. If a particular wetland is 'not
significantly intertwined with the ecosystem of adjacent waterways,' then the Corps may
allow its development 'simply by issuing a permit."' Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2258 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The Court in Riverside explained that where it is reasonable for the Corps
to determine that there are considerable environmental effects on surrounding
ecosystems in most cases involving adjacent wetlands, its decision to define all adjacent
wetlands as "waters" may stand. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 135 n.9
(1985).
'99See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining Court's
unanimous decision in Riverside was properly deferential to the political branches of
government); see also Riverside, 474 U.S. at 123 (presenting opinion of a unanimous
Court).
20 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2257-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Congress'
meaningful acquiescence to 1977 regulations of the Corps as additional support for Corps'
jurisdiction over non-isolated wetlands); see also Susanne Goodson, Comment, Charting a
Course Through Nonnavigable Waters Using the SWACC Compass, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 287,
297 (2005) (stating that in its passage of the 1977 amendments to CWA, Court in
Riverside determined that Congress impliedly acquiesced to Corps' broader definition of
navigable waters).
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Stevens asserted that "[b]ecause there is ambiguity in the phrase
'waters of the United States' and because interpreting it broadly
to cover such ditches and streams advances the purpose of the
Act, the Corps' approach should command our deference." 20 1 He
further stated that "all identifiable tributaries that ultimately
drain into large bodies of water ' 20 2 should be included within the
scope of CWA jurisdiction because such inclusion furthers the
purpose of the CWA-to protect "downstream water quality. ' 20 3 It
follows that all wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally
navigable waters should receive categorical coverage by the
CWA.2 °4 Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens would hold
that any nexus with navigable waters is sufficient. 20 5 Even so,
with some skepticism, Justice Stevens acknowledged instances
where, as in SWANCC, there may exist wholly isolated, 20non6
navigable, intrastate waters that have no downstream effect.
Substantially though, Justice Stevens' test, asks whether there
is any "plausibly discernible relationship to any aspect of
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 2263 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of "downstream
water quality" in the jurisdictional assessment).
204 See id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that all wetlands adjacent to
tributaries of navigable waters categorically affect downstream water quality and thus
automatically fall under CWA jurisdiction); see also U.S. v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 707 (4th
Cir. 2003) (explaining long standing principle that Congress authorized with the CWA to
protect non-navigable waters where pollutants have potential to adversely affect
downstream water quality of navigable waters).
20' The dissent's focus on downstream water quality forms the foundation for its total
deference to the Corps' regulations. By focusing on water quality issues, the dissent
acknowledges the relationship between ecological considerations and deference. Thus, any
nexus that implicates downstream water quality, according to the dissent, is sufficient for
jurisdictional purposes. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even under
the "significant nexus" standard presented by Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens
maintained that such a test is automatically satisfied where wetlands are adjacent to
navigable waters. Mank, supra note 149, at 341.
206 "Unlike the 'nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters' in SWANCC... [wetlands
adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters] can obviously have a cumulative effect on
downstream water flow by releasing waters at times of low flow or by keeping waters back
at times of high flow. This logical connection alone gives the wetlands the 'limited'
connection to traditionally navigable waters that is all the statute requires-and
disproves Justice Kennedy's claim that my approach gives no meaning to the word
'navigable[.']
Similarly, these wetlands can preserve downstream water quality by
trapping sediment, filtering toxic pollutants, protecting fish-spawning grounds, and so
forth. While there may exist categories of wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally
navigable waters that, taken cumulatively, have no plausibly discernable relationship to
any aspect of downstream water quality, I am skeptical." Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264
(Steven, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Contra SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding
that the Army Corps of Engineers could not assert jurisdiction over isolated intrastate
waters).
201
202
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downstream water quality., 20 7 If the answer is yes, then a
jurisdictional finding is reasonable. Consequently, the dissenting
Justices found that all four wetlands at issue exhibited the
requisite relationship with downstream water quality and thus
no remand for fact-finding was necessary.20 8
III. ANALYSIS
A. Chevron Deference
The various opinions in Rapanos illustrate the Justices'
20 9
disparate views on the proper allocation of agency deference.
"Chevron Deference," as it is called, refers to the judicial practice
of deferring to agency decision-making when such decisions are
"based on a permissible construction of [a] statute.2 1 0 For
example, when the Corps initiates a jurisdictional assessment
under Section 404, its decisions are sheltered from challenge by a
two-step analysis that determines whether the Corps permissibly
interpreted the CWA.2 11 Under the Chevron analysis, the first
question is whether Congress "has directly addressed the precise
question at issue, and if so, whether it has [answered]
unambiguously. '2 12 If Congress has not addressed the precise
question presented, or it has answered that question
ambiguously, a reviewing court must turn to the second prong of
the Chevron analysis and ask whether "the agency's
interpretation is reasonable." 21 3 If the congressional enactment
207
208

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 159.
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225; See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (classifying the Corps' ecological judgment about the
relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides as an adequate basis
for a legal judgment).
209 See Knutsen, supra note 133, at 164-65 (discussing the confusion spurred by the

SWANCC opinions); see also Breedon, supra note 40, at 1471 (noting the inconsistencies
that arise when applying the Clean Water Act to wetlands).
210

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see Knutsen, aupra note 133, at 167 (characterizing

judicial deference of agency decision-making as "Chevron deference" after the seminal
Chevron case).
211

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (according agencies a relaxed standard of scrutiny

when making decisions relevant to their unique expertise); see also Breedon, supra note
40, at 1472 (asserting that the Corps assert extensive jurisdiction over several categories
of waters without much reference to section 404).
212 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also Breedon, supra note 40, at 1471.
210 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
127 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2007) (supporting the Chevron analysis as a means of examining

the actions of agencies).
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being interpreted does not "directly and clearly address the
precise matter at issue," then as long as the agency's
interpretation is reasonable the reviewing court should defer.21 4
Evidence of reasonableness can be shown when the agency's
interpretation (1) involves a technical and complex assessment,
(2) requires the reconciliation of conflicting interests, and (3)
"consider[s] the matter in a detailed and reasonable
fashion. .. "215
B. Chevron Deference and Ecological Considerations
The inherent tension between the Scalia plurality, Kennedy
concurrence and the Stevens dissent is directly related to varying
allocations of Chevron Deference. Justice Scalia believes that the
Corps should be given little deference while Justice Kennedy
supports a middle ground and Justice Stevens promotes nearabsolute deference.
This deference continuum is related to the Corps' reliance on
ecological factors. 216 The plurality, concurrence, and dissent each
answer the following question differently: How much weight is
the Corps permitted to give to ecological considerations in
determining whether a particular parcel of land is covered by the
CWA?
If the answer is that ecological considerations are
irrelevant in the jurisdictional assessment, then you would agree
with the plurality.2 17 On the other hand, if you think that
ecological considerations are of paramount importance than you
would agree with the dissent.2 18 It follows that, Justice Kennedy
falls in the middle of these two extremes.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also Breedon, supra note 40, at 1472.
215 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
211 See 33 C.F.R. 320.4(b) (2007) (outlining the Corps' regulatory policies regarding the
214

issuance of section 404 permits defining relevant ecological considerations with regard to
wetlands functioning as including such factors as biological functions, food-chain
production, nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic species, natural
drainage characteristics, sedimentation patterns, salinity distribution, flushing
characteristics, current patterns, or other environmental characteristics , erosion, storm
drainage, water purification functions, ecological interrelationship with other wetlands in
the region among other things); see also Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 351, 358-59
(2006) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (discussing how Scalia and Kennedy's opinions differ
in granting the Corps discretion in determining when there is an ecological nexus).
17 See Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2226 (2006) (stating that the Corps may rely
on its ecological judgment only to categorize wetlands directly abutting navigable waters
as falling under the CWA).
21' Id. at 2257. "Specifically, these wetlands abut tributaries of traditionally navigable
waters. As we recognized in Riverside Bayview, the Corps has concluded that such
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The relationship between Chevron Deference and the Corps'
assessment of ecological factors derives from the decision-making
flexibility the ecological assessment allows for.2 19 Permitting the
Corps to wholeheartedly rely on ecological impact assessments
necessarily provides for substantial leeway to argue in favor of
jurisdiction based on the most attenuated hydrologic
connection.2 2 ° Justice Scalia attempted to rein in the Corps'
decision-making power by invalidating the ecological effects test
in favor of a physical connection test. 22 1 Justice Kennedy also
attempted to limit the Corps' power, albeit to a lesser extent, by
requiring a minimum showing of significant ecological effect.2 22
Finally, the dissent made little attempt to limit the Corps'
decision-making power, citing the Corps' unique ability to

wetlands play important roles in maintaining the quality of their adjacent waters, and
consequently in the waters downstream. Among other things, wetlands can offer 'nesting,
spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic or land species'; 'serve as valuable storage
areas for storm and flood waters'; and provide 'significant water purification functions.'
These values are hardly 'independent' ecological considerations as the plurality would
have it, instead they are integral to the 'chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters. Given that wetlands serve these important water quality roles and given
the ambiguity inherent in the phrase 'waters of the U.S.,' the Corps has reasonably
interpreted its jurisdiction to cover non-isolated wetlands." Id. (citations omitted).
219 See Leading Cases, supra note 216, at 358-59 (arguing that the Corps' reliance on
ecological considerations permits it to exercise greater discretion in the form of its
"scientific expertise" thus indicating that the plurality's and Justice Kennedy's standards,
by placing judicially created limitations on the Corps, rein in the its discretion, albeit to
varying extents); see also Currie, supra note 143, at 219 (noting the variation in discretion
goven to the Corps in the opinions of Scalia and Kennedy).
220 See Manning, supra note 84, at 870-73 (discussing the ability to connect physically
isolated wetlands to navigable waters by way of ecological factors such as ground water
interconnection, vegetative uniformity and surface runoff); see also Randall S. Guttery,
Federal Wetlands Regulation: Restrictions on the Nationwide Permit Program and the
Implications for Residential Property Owners, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 299, 307-08 (2000)
(evaluating Riverside's endorsement of the ecological test); Brief for Association of State
Wetland Managers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Rapanos v. U.S., 126
S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384) (citing note 22 Gomi, T., R. C. Sidle and J. S.
Richardson. 2002. Understanding processes and downstream linkages of headwater
systems. BioScience 52:905-16) (explaining that all upstream wetlands affect downstream
hydrology and biology thus indicating that virtually all wetlands in the U.S. may
potentially possess an ecological nexus with navigable waters).
221 See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2226 n. 10 (positing that Riverside only spoke to
actually abutting wetlands as falling within the term "waters" and that physically
separated, nearby wetlands cannot naturally be characterized as "waters" despite the
potential for ecological impact).
222 Id. at 2249. "[T]he Corps must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis
when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable tributaries. Given
the potential overbreadth of the Corps' regulations, this showing is necessary to avoid
unreasonable applications of the statute." Id.
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promote the fundamental223 purpose of the CWA-to protect
downstream water quality.
C. Ecological Factorsv. Physical Connection: The Deference
Continuum
The plurality held that wetlands are "waters" only when they
exhibit a "continuous surface connection to [navigable waters]"
such that the wetland in question is virtually "indistinguishable"
with the abutting navigable water.2 2 4 Supporting its continuous
surface connection test, the plurality explained that Riverside
and SWANCC, when taken together, ostensibly prohibit the
Corps from considering ecological factors when making
jurisdictional assessments.22 5 Focusing on the facts of the case,
the plurality explained that SWANCC held that "ecological
considerations [were] irrelevant to the question of whether
physically isolated waters come within the Corps' jurisdiction. 2 2 6
Therefore, the plurality read SWANCC as not only invalidating
the migratory bird rule, but also as revoking the lower court's
acceptance of the ecological effects test after Riverside.
According to the plurality, SWANCC confirmed that Riverside
Bayview "rested upon the inherent ambiguity in defining where
water ends and abutting wetlands begin, permitting the Corps'
reliance on ecological considerations only to resolve that
ambiguity in favor of treating all abutting wetlands as waters. '22 v
Thus, the plurality's deference to the Corps is limited to the
categorical designation of actually abutting wetlands.2 28 Beyond
the scope of such wetlands, the Corps cannot rely on ecological
considerations, but rather must rely on a continuous surface
water connection to confer jurisdiction.22 9
223

Id. at 2257. "Given that wetlands serve these important water quality roles and

given the ambiguity inherent in the phrase 'waters of the United States,' the Corps has
reasonably interpreted its jurisdiction to cover non-isolated wetlands." Id.
224 Id. at 2226-34. 'Thus, only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to
the bodies that are 'waters of the United States' in their own right, so that there is no
clear demarcation between 'waters' and wetlands, are 'adjacent to' such waters and
covered by the Act." Id. at 2226 (emphasis added).
225 Id. at 2225-27 (discussing the relevance of Riverside and SWANCC with regard to
the "inherent ambiguity in defining where water ends and abutting wetlands begin").
226 Id. at 2226.
228

Id.
Id.

229

See supra note 204.

227
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Particularly relevant to the plurality's characterization of
Riverside and SWANCC is its interpretation of the phrase "the
waters of the United States." The plurality focused on the scope
of ambiguity inherent in the term "waters."230 Discussing this
scope, the plurality explained that SWANCC and Riverside
established that "waters" is ambiguous only in some respects.2 3 1
According to the plurality, "waters" is not ambiguous with
respect to open water but it is ambiguous with respect to
wetlands merely nearby.23 2
Harmonizing its statutory
interpretation of "waters" with Riverside, the plurality stated
that the abutting wetlands in Riverside were ambiguous only to
the point that it invoked the "boundary drawing problem" and
thus in this limited circumstance Chevron deference was
appropriate.2 33 On the other hand, in SWANCC, since no
boundary drawing problem arose with respect to SWANCCs
physically isolated waters, no ambiguity issue existed.2 34
Accordingly, in this type of situation Chevron Deference is
inappropriate.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence characterized Riverside and
SWANCC as granting the Corps greater freedom to assess
ecological factors than the plurality would allow.
Citing
Riverside's deference to the Corps, Justice Kennedy approved of
the Corps' reasonable reliance on ecological considerations in
determining that wetlands abutting navigable waters were
covered by the CWA.235 However, Justice Kennedy noted that the
Riverside Court reserved "the question of the Corps' authority to
230

Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2229. The scope of ambiguity is "determined by a wetland's

physical connection to covered waters, not its ecological relationship thereto." Id. at 2229.
231 Id. at 2226. Like any statutory term, "waters" may be interpreted differently as
seen in the opinion. The plurality argues that the scope of ambiguity defines the extent of
Chevron Deference afforded to the Corps. Justice Scalia believes that the scope of
ambiguity does not extend to wetlands in mere "reasonable proximity" to navigable
waters. Id. at 2226 n.10.
232 Id.
(discussing the "boundary drawing problem" in Riverside and the limited
deference afforded to the Corps when such a problem provides an adequate basis for
reliance on ecological judgment that such wetlands be defined as waters under the Act).
233 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225-26, 2226 n.10.
234 Id. at 2226 (stating that "[ilsolated ponds were not 'waters of the U.S.' in
their own
right, and presented no boundary-drawing problem that would have justified the
invocation of ecological factors to treat them as such.") (citation omitted).
235 See id. at 2245 (discussing how the Corps' conclusions that wetlands serve
important water quality functions such as filtering, storing and purifying are relevant
ecological considerations that support the Corps' reasonable definition of adjacency that
was upheld in Riverside).
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regulate wetlands other than those adjacent to open waters.
Discussing SWANCC's effect on the Riverside holding, Justice
Kennedy explained that SWANCC addressed the validity of the
Corps' reliance on the migratory bird rule.2 37 Finding that the
migratory bird rule was irrelevant to the statutory construction
of the term "waters," the SWANCC Court held that it is the
"significant nexus" between navigable waters and wetlands that
establishes CWA jurisdiction.23 8 It follows that the significant
nexus requirement acknowledges ecological considerations to the
extent that such considerations are significant. 239 Appropriately
understood and yet deliberately undefined, the significant nexus
requirement reflects Justice Kennedy's apportionment of
Chevron deference allocated to the Corps by way of recognition of
ecological considerations. Where the plurality accords no weight
to ecological considerations, Justice Kennedy permits some, but
only if the Corps can identify "substantial evidence" that dispels
the notion that ecological evidence is "speculative. 2 4 °
Justice Stevens' dissent characterized Riverside and SWANCC
differently than both the plurality and the concurrence.
According to the dissent, Chevron deference requires recognition
of the Corps' reasonable interpretation of "waters" in order to
advance the purpose of the CWA.24 1 Specifically, the dissent
found that Riverside answered the broader issue of whether CWA
jurisdiction covered wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and
2 4 2 Therefore, the dissent would categorically
their tributaries.

236
237
238
219

Id. at 2240.
Id. at 2240-41.
Id. at 2241.
Id. at 2247-38. It appears from Justice Kennedy's opinion that hydrographic

features such as groundwater or surface water runoff and ecological features such as
biological and chemical interconnections may be considered by the Corps in assessing
jurisdiction. Id. at 2248. Indeed, Justice Kennedy noted the scientific complexity involved
in any jurisdictional assessment and stated his concern that the plurality's continuous
surface connection test failed to protect against water quality problems relating to
flooding, groundwater connections, downstream discharge of dredge and fill materials and
intermittent stream runoff. Id. at 2245.
240 Id. at 2251.
241 Id. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the difficulty in drawing clean
lines between land and water (boundary drawing problem) created the need to defer to
the Corps' judgment in order to advance the purpose of the CWA).
242 Id. (discussing how the Riverside Court characterized the question presented as
whether the CWA extends to wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and their tributaries
even though the facts of the case dealt only with the a particular wetland actually
abutting an open body of water).
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define adjacency as including wetlands "that form
the border of
24
or are in reasonable proximity to other waters. 3
Endorsing
the
Corps'
wholesale
use
of ecological
considerations, the dissent, citing Riverside, stated that "[i]f it is
reasonable for the Corps to conclude that in the majority of cases,
adjacent wetlands have significant effects on water quality and
the ecosystem, its definitions can stand. 2 44 Where Justice
Kennedy requires substantial evidence of significant ecological
impact, the dissent requires only evidence that the Corps'
reliance on ecological factors was reasonable under the
circumstances. This effectively places a lesser burden on the
Corps to substantiate its findings in a reviewing court and thus
permits the Corps substantial leeway in fashioning creative
ecological arguments in support of its jurisdictional assessments.
D. Scalia Plurality'sUnprecedented Interpretation
Focusing on the undue "burden of federal regulation" placed on
private landowners, the Scalia plurality attempted to lay down a
bright-line rule to reduce litigation and limit the Corps' decisionmaking power. 24 5 Inherent in the plurality's holding is its
adversity to the Corps' power over private landowners and its
disregard for the purpose of the CWA.24 6 As a result, the plurality
fashioned the Court's narrowest rule in order "to protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to ... plan the
development and use of land and water resources ... Focusing
on the definite article "the" and the plural noun "waters," the
plurality argued that "waters" does not refer to water in general,
but rather more narrowly to water "as found in streams and
bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, and
lakes, or the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods,
243 Id. at 2255-56 (highlighting Congress's implied acquiescence in 1977 to the Corps's
asserted jurisdiction over wetlands "that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity
to other waters").
244 Id. at 2256.
241 Id. at 2214 (Scalia, J., plurality) (noting the burden of federal regulation on
landowners and characterizing the Corps as an "enlightened despot" with regard to its
decision-making power).
246 Id. at 2235 n.15 (discussing the opaqueness of Justice Kennedy's significant nexus
requirement and arguing that such an "unverifiable standard is not likely to constrain an
agency whose disregard for the statutory language has been so long manifested").
247 Id. at 2215 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §1251(b) (2007)).
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making up such streams or bodies. 248 The import of terms such
as rivers, streams, lakes, and oceans, according to the plurality,
clearly connotes "continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as
opposed to ordinarily dry channels through which water
occasionally or intermittently flows. ' 249 Therefore, "waters"
should be understood to include only "relatively permanent,
standing or flowing bodies of water., 250 Additionally, bolstering
its "relatively permanent" designation, the plurality cited Section
502's separate treatment of "point sources" as an indicator that
intermittent watercourses fall outside the scope of "the waters of
the United States. 2 5 '
While the plurality's pursuit of a bright line rule to reduce
litigation and protect private landowners is admirable, it is
undeniably an attempt to legislate a new rule unsupported by the
language and purpose of the CWA and the case law interpreting
it.252 Particularly alarming is the plurality's characterization of
"waters" to not include intermittent or irregular flows. 253 Justice
Kennedy noted that the plurality's "point source" treatment
ignores the fact that such channels and conduits may contain
permanent flows and thus be simultaneously classified 254
as
"waters" under the Act subject to dredge and fill permitting.
Nowhere in the CWA is "point source" restricted to intermittent
watercourses and the plurality's unprecedented distinction
between "point source" and "waters" threatens to exclude
polluting point sources from section 404 jurisdiction.2 5
248
249
250

251

Id. at 2220-21 (analyzing the statutory text with the help of Webster's dictionary).
Id. at 2221.
Id.
Id. at 2223 ("separate classification of 'ditch[es], channel[s], and conduit[s]' - which

are terms ordinarily used to describe the watercourses through which intermittent waters
typically flow - shows that these are, by and large, not 'waters of the U.S."').
252 Id.
at 2242 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the limitations on the Act
imposed by the plurality are not supported by the language of the Act nor the purpose of
the Act).
253 Id. at 2221 (finding that the dictionary definition of the term "waters," which
includes the terms streams, oceans, rivers and lakes, connotes permanent, standing
bodies of water that excludes recognition of intermittent flows).
254 Id.
at 2243 (suggesting that polluted water can flow from pipes, channels, or
conduits and be point sources, otherwise "effluent streams from sewage treatment plants"
would be excluded).
2*5 Id. (positing that distinctions between waters and point sources are "unsound" by
ignoring streams from sewage treatment plants, which can be both water sources and
point sources); see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2007) (defining a "point source" as "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
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Furthermore, the plurality's exclusion of intermittent waters
from Section 404 completely disregards the reality that the vast
majority of rivers (approximately 75% or more) in the Western
United States are non-perennial or intermittent. 25 6 As a result of
the plurality's holding, "[i]ntermittent streams [will] be allowed
to be used for waste disposal, thus imperiling [western] perennial
streams during times of connected flow. '257 For example, Walker
Lake and Pyramid Lake, both in Nevada, are two unique
freshwater desert lakes that support large fisheries and
substantial recreational economies. 258 Under the plurality's
"relatively permanent" test, the surrounding intermittent
streams and wetlands that provide water to those lakes are all at
risk of unfettered deposition of dredge and fill material, thus
placing the Nevada citizens who rely on those intermittent
streams and wetlands at a substantial risk of economic loss in
the future. 259 Additionally, intermittent streams in the West
behave differently from what most people east of the Mississippi
River typically think of as a stream. Intermittent and ephemeral
streams in the West feed downstream perennial rivers and lakes
during periods of overland flow. 260 Intermittent overland flow
channel, tunnel, conduit, well.., or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants
are or may be discharged").
256 Brief for Western Organization of Resource Councils as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384), 2004 U.S.
Briefs 1034, 20 (citing Comments of the Western Water Alliance to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Docket ID OW-2002-0050, April 16, 2003, Table 2, at
pages 9-10 (attached hereto as Appendix 2)). In Arizona, non-perennial rivers account for
96% of all river miles in the state. Id.; see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 841-B-06-002,
WADEABLE STREAMS ASSESSMENT: A COLLABORATIVE SURVEY OF THE NATION'S STREAMS

(2006), available at www.epa.gov/owow/streamsurvey. The majority of the streams in the
western U.S. do not flow continuously. Id.
257 Brief for Western Organization of Resource Councils, supra note 256, at 21.
258 See id. at 21 n. 11 (explaining that in Mineral County, Nevada the local government
is extremely concerned with preserving the wetlands of Walker Lake and Pyramid Lanke
because the provide a great economic benefit); see also Sierra Club, Walker Lake:
Nevada's
International
Treasure,
http://nevada.sierraclub.org/conservation
/walkerlakelWLbriefing.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (noting that Walker Lake is
famous for its Lahotan cutthroat trout fisher and that its recreational uses are the
"mainstay of the economy of small rural Mineral County").
259 Brief for Western Organization of Resource Councils, supra note 256, at 21 n.11
(announcing that the Walker Lake is one of only five fresh, deep water desert lakes in the
world that supports a substantial fishery); see National Wildlife Federation, Weakening
the Clean Water Act: What it Means for Nevada, available at http://www.nwf.org/wildlife
/pdfs/CleanWaterActNevada.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (stating that the wetlands in
Nevada supports the recreational economy and that the Nevada waters need to be
protected from charges of pollutants, dredge, and fill activities).
260 See Brief for W. Org. of Res. Councils, supra note 256, at 22-23 (discussing the
characteristics of stream systems in the Western U.S. and how the failure to protect such

2008]

PROTECTINGAMERICA'S WETLANDS

generally occurs as a result of rainfall, snowmelt, groundwater
contribution or other precipitation runoff.261 The problem with
plurality's "relatively permanent" test is that it fails to
acknowledge the paramount importance of Western intermittent
and ephemeral streams in downstream water quality and
downstream water recharge.2 6 2 If the plurality's test is binding,
groundwater and perennial stream recharge could be reduced
significantly, which will have an adverse affect on municipal
drinking water, irrigation water availability, and water quality.
This indicates that the plurality's unprecedented reliance on
Webster's dictionary fails to acknowledge not only the CWA's
purpose in protecting water quality but also the scientific
complexity involved in water quality impact assessments.
The plurality's disregard for the role and purpose of
intermittent streams and their adjacent wetlands in downstream
water quality could have a substantial effect on navigable
waters.2 6 3 Rivers, lakes, streams and tributaries are the units
intermittent streams from dredged and fill material will inevitably result in negative
downstream effects and water quality and water availability problems); see generally
Community Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943 (9th
Cir. 2002) (presenting an example of the potentially harmful effects on stream systems
absent regulation where high fecal coliform bacteria associated with animal manure was
found in the water supply used by the largest dairy in Washington).
261 See Brief for W. Org. of Res. Councils, supra note 256, at 22 (noting that such
streams "feed downstream perennial waters by overland flow during times when streams
carry groundwater contribution, snowmelt, and other precipitation runoff'); see also
Kenneth W. Tate, California Rangelands Research and Information Center, Monitoring
Series: Streamflow, July 1995, available at http://californiarangeland.ucdavis.edu
/Publications%20pdf/MS9.pdf (explaining that intermittent and ephemeral streams are
seasonal or storm related overland flows that transport precipitation downslope over the
surface of the soil).
262 Courts in the West, both district and appellate, have consistently upheld federal
jurisdiction over non-perennial tributary waters. See Quivira Mining Co. v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985). The Quivira court affirmed the EPA's
determination that a CWA permit was required for discharges into surface arroyos that,
during storms, channeled rainwater both directly to streams and into underground
aquifers that connected with such streams. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation
Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit held that "even tributaries that
flow intermittently are 'waters of the U.S."' The reasoning for including intermittent
tributaries within the jurisdiction of the Act is clear: "As long as the tributary would flow
into the navigable body, it is capable of spreading environmental damage and is thus a
'water of the U.S.' under the Act."' Id. at 534 (quoting U.S. v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1342
(11th Cir. 1997).
263 See Brief for Ass'n of State Wetland Managers as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384), 2004 U.S.
Briefs 1034, 36 (emphasizing that the potentially devastating effects of inadequate
attention and care for streams and wetlands is a factor of their close connection to various
ecological systems (citing Takashi Gomi, et al., UnderstandingProcesses and Downstream
Linkages of Headwater Systems, October 2002, http://faculty.forestry.ubc.ca/richardson
/abstracts/Gomi-etal2002.pdf); see also Richard B. Alexander, et al., The Role of
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that typically comprise a watershed. Visually, they form a treelike pattern.2 6 4 The outermost branches of this tree represent the
more remote waters such as intermittent and ephemeral streams
and their adjacent wetlands. 265 Small alterations to these
outemostmay
ater266
outermost branches may have little water quality impact.
However, numerous alterations aggregated together may
substantially affect the overall health and functioning of the
watershed.2 6 7 Failing to cover intermittent and ephemeral
streams, therefore, directly subverts the "congressional concern"
with protecting downstream water quality.
The plurality opinion also fails to acknowledge the imperative
ecological needs in preserving wetlands. The importance of
protecting navigable waters is evident by the fact that between
the years 1986 to 1997 an estimated net loss of 644,000 acres of
wetlands in the United States occurred due to human activities
such
as
urban
development,
agriculture
and
rural
development.2 68 It is imperative then, to defer to the Corps'
ecological judgment when determining CWA jurisdiction in light
Headwater Streams in Downstream Water Quality, Feb. 2007, available at
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/J. 1752-1688.2007.00005.x
(suggesting
that headwater and streams play an integral role in linking pollutant sources and highorder, or navigable, streams).
264 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "What
is a Watershed?", Apr. 3, 2007,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/whatis.html
(describing the intricate ecological
relationship present in all watersheds); see also Sarah Dorner and David Swayne,
Transforming Watershed Modelling Components Into Graphical Probability Networks,
(2004), http://www.elet.polimi.it/IFAC-TCEnvironment /Venice2004/poster
/lv04swayne.pdf (explaining generally that the importance of protection rests in the
interconnected drainage network comprised of fields, ponds, streams and rivers, to name
a few).
265 See Brief for Ass'n of State Wetland Managers, supra note 263, at 33 (stating that
these "leaves and twigs" are known as first and second order streams, ditches and
wetlands); see also Judy L. Meyer, et al., Where Rivers Are Born: The Scientific Imperative
for Defending Small Streams and Wetlands, February, 2007, available at
http://www.sierraclub.orglhealthycommunities/rivers/WRABreport-full.pdf (claiming that
these headwater streams often appear to be insignificant as a result of their relative size).
266 See Brief for Ass'n of State Wetland Managers, supra note 263, at
33.
267 See id. at 34 (concluding that the aggregate detrimental effects on the "tree" are a
factor of the interconnectivity of the corresponding "branches"); see also Winsor H. Lowe
and Gene E. Likens, Moving Headwater Streams to the Head of the Class, BIOSPHERE,
Mar.
2005,
at
196,
available at
http://www.ohvec.org/galleries/reclamation
/moving-headwater streams.pdf (stating that headwater streams, although relatively
small, account for nearly seventy percent of stream-channel length in this country).
268 See THOMAS E. DAHL, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TRENDS OF
WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS U.S. 1986 TO 1997, 29-30 (2000) (discussing net loss of
wetlands in U.S. due to human activities and providing useful figures to illustrate various
losses occurring to different types of wetlands); see also NAT'L WETLANDS INVENTORY,
Summary Findings: STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS U.S. 1986

TO 1997, DAHL, T.E. (2000).
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of the substantial losses that are presently occurring. 2 69 The
plurality's continuous surface connection test is simply a poor
proxy for ecological impact and thus is irrelevant in the context of
a statute concerned with downstream water quality. It is well
established that upstream headwaters, tributaries and wetlands
serve important water quality roles such as water filtration,
retention of nutrients, removal of pollutants and reduction of
sediment export.2 7 ° Moreover, wetlands can offer "nesting,
spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic or land species
[and] serve as valuable areas for storm and flood waters. 2 7 1
Wetlands and tributaries have also been shown to provide
economic benefits including decreases in the cost of downstream
water treatment, improvements in recreational opportunities,
increases in property values and decreases in the health risks
associated with microbial pathogens in drinking water.27 2
There may also be compelling social and economic interests in
wetland preservation based on wetlands' unique ability to
269

The plurality's test seems to limit the current scope of federal regulation, which

will potentially result in a regulatory gap in some states. A subsequent decrease in federal
authority may prompt those states to take action to fill the void. In other states, this
regulatory void may already be filled. Still in others, state regulators may seek to
deregulate. Some may argue that federal regulations are necessary to prevent the
possibility that states will choose not to regulate certain wetlands in order to promote
economic development. This is predicated on a "race to the bottom theory." On the other
hand, some states may seek to strengthen their regulations in response to strong public
demand for environmental protection. States often regulate wetlands however sometimes
such regulation may be ineffective. With regard to the CWA, it seems relevant that the
purpose of the statute is to protect the biological and ecological health of the Nation's
waters. Thus, given the historical decrease in wetlands across the country as a result of
various human activities, it is imperative that the federal program reach those remaining
wetlands that can be said to reasonably fall within the language of the CWA and are
subject to unfettered development. Whether the states or the federal government is in a
better position to regulate is a question for an entirely different article. Indeed, in some
instances, as noted above, there may be strong justifications from an environmental
protection standpoint to allow states to assume such authority because they will choose to
draft more stringent regulations. I only point out that there is a delicate balance between
state and federal authority and in some instances, as exemplified by Section 404(g), there
is an overlap. Either way, the states are not always effective regulators and thus it may
be important for the federal authority to step in to prevent the unnecessary destruction of
wetlands validly falling under the language of the CWA.
270

See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE

AND REGULATION,
OTA-O-206,
at 43,
48-49
(Mar.
1984),
available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/OTA_4/DATA/1984/8433.pdf;
see U.S. v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134-35 (1985) (citing the undisputed and significant
water quality roles that wetlands play in preserving aquatic environment).
271 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2)(i) (2007); Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134-35.
272 For an in-depth analysis of the "irreplaceable ecosystem services" provided by
wetlands see supra note 232, at 35-41 (citing various scientific reports that support
wetlands' water quality roles and economic relevance). Kristen Schuyt & Luke Brander,
The Econonic Values of the World's Wetlands, 8-11 (WWF-International 2004) (2004).
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mitigate flooding. 2 73 For example, roughly 60 percent of the
estimated forty-five million acres of wetlands that existed prior
to the development of the Mississippi River watershed were
destroyed by land use practices.2 74 As a result, "[w]ater that
would have taken weeks to months to move downstream now
reaches the [Mississippi] River in a matter of hours."2 7' 5 The
effects of these historical wetland losses on flooding potential
became apparent in 1993 when the Mississippi River experienced
catastrophic flooding causing a forty-eight percent reduction in
farm products being shipped south on the river. 276 Presumably,
much of this economic loss could have been mitigated had the
Mississippi watershed received greater wetland protection during
its era of land development.2 7 7 Moreover, the Hurricane Katrina
disaster of 2005 and its associated flooding exemplified the need
for increased protection of wetlands.2 78 Specifically, Louisiana,
the state most affected by Katrina, contains roughly 40 percent of
all the wetlands in the continental United States. 279 Because
Louisiana and other southern coastal states like Alabama,
Florida and Texas contain many wetlands and are particularly
vulnerable to hurricanes, wetland protection efforts are
particularly important in this region to ensure that such
273

See Knutsen, supra note 133, at 183-85 (noting the severe impact flooding has had

in the past on land use practices and transportation of goods throughout the nation); see
also Wetlands and Flood Control in the Mississippi Watershed, Envtl. Rev. Newsl. (Envtl.
Rev., Seattle, Wash.), Aug. 1996, available at http://www.environmentalreview.org
/vol03/hey.html.
274 See Knutsen, supra note 133, at 184; see also Elizabeth
Rooks-Barber, Bruce Reid
& Nicholas Winstead, Waterbirds on Working Lands in Mississippi, TECHNICAL REPORT
JAN. 2007 at 7 (Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Vicksburg, Miss.).
275 Knutsen, supra note 133, at 184 (quoting Wetlands and Flood Control in the
Mississippi Watershed, Envtl. Rev. Newsl. (Envtl. Rev., Seattle, Wash.), Aug. 1996,
available at http://www.environmentalreview.org/vol03/hey.html).
276

Id.

See William K. Stevens, The High Risks of Denying Rivers Their Flood Plains,N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 20, 1993, at Cl (stating that large-scale land development on flood plains (and
the accompanying interference with the surrounding wetlands) contributed to the
increased economic losses sustained from floods, which nearly tripled in the period from
1951 to 1985 as compared with the period from 1916 through 1950).
278 See Hurricane Katrina: Assessing the Present Environmental Status: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Erik D. Olson, Senior
Attorney, National Resources Defense Council), available at http:// www.nrdc.org
/legislation/katrina/0509291a.pdf (noting that the weaknesses inherent in the
environmental safeguards implemented in Gulf Coast communities were exposed as a
result of Hurricane Katrina, in particular, the loss of coastal wetlands in Louisiana, which
would have "substantially reduc[ed] the storm's impact").
279 See
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands: A Resource at Risk, available at
http://marine.usgs.gov/fact-sheetsfLAwetlands/lawetlands.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2007).
277
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wetlands continue to "provide a buffer against the impact of
future hurricanes" and associated flooding. 28 0 Spurred by
Katrina, Congress is currently considering proposals to authorize
the Corps to implement certain restoration efforts that will slow
the rate of coastal wetlands loss in the region. 28 1 The plurality's
holding fails to consider the important role wetlands play in
floodwater retention, providing another compelling justification
for its inadequacy.
E. Who Got It Right?
Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test fails to fully
acknowledge the importance of floodwater retention.
While
presumably the Corps will have some leeway to cover wetlands
with more attenuated connections to navigable waters than the
simple direct abutment test advocated by the plurality, Justice
Kennedy's test leaves no room for a substantial effects argument
based on flood control. This relates to the watershed concept
noted above. Wetlands and tributaries that are found on the
margins of the watershed "tree" will typically not have a
significant nexus with the more central navigable waters that
make up the heart of the watershed.28 2 Thus, under Justice
Kennedy's "significant nexus" test, marginal wetlands are at
greater risk of destruction and could eventually disappear; the
loss of few having an insignificant effect on water quality, but the
loss of many potentially having a substantial effect on water
280 See Pervaze A. Sheikh, The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Biological Resources,
Oct. 18, 2005, available at http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33117_20051018.pdf.
281 Id.; see Jeffrey A. Zinn, Coastal Louisiana Ecosystem Restoration After Hurricanes

Katrina and Rita, Mar. 17, 2006, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org
/assets/crs/RS22276.pdf (discussing the Corps' proposed initiatives being considered by
Congress in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that would seek to protect or
restore hundreds of thousands of acres of Louisiana's wetlands).
212 Justice
Kennedy's significant nexus test requires substantial evidence of
significant impact and thus marginal wetlands that have minimal individual impact will
not satisfy this test. Therefore, despite such wetlands' ability to affect navigable waters
individually and substantially affect navigable waters in the aggregate, they will be
excluded from federal regulation. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S 111, 122-24, 127-28
(1942), This exemplifies both the failure of Justice Kennedy's test to appropriately guard
against downstream water quality impact as well as the incompatibility of the dissent's
desire to read "navigable" out of the statute and Justice Kennedy's emphasis on balancing
the statutory language with the overall purpose of the CWA. Despite Justice Kennedy's
laudable attempt at balancing these interests, Congress undoubtedly addressed the
deletion of the term "navigable" in the 1977 debates and impliedly acquiesced to the
Corps' expansive regulations. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 159, 186-87 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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quality. 283 Given the history of wetland losses in this country and
the need to increase protection of any remaining wetlands for

flood control and water quality purposes, this author believes
that the greater protections provided by the dissent are the most
appropriate.
F. What happens next?
The Rapanos Court's fractured decision gives rise to the
question of whether the plurality's approach or Justice Kennedy's
approach is the controlling rule of law. Addressing this question,
Justice Stevens, at the conclusion of his dissenting opinion,
stated that "all four Justices who have joined this opinion would
uphold the Corps' jurisdiction ...

in all other cases in which

either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied .... ,,284
Continuing with this logic, Justice Stevens stated, "[i]n sum, in
these and future cases, the United States may elect to prove
jurisdiction under either test. '2

5

Notwithstanding the Justice

Stevens' directive, some lower courts have held that Justice
Kennedy's standard alone is the controlling rule of law. 28 6 Still

other activists have asserted that the plurality controls.28 7
Contrasting evaluations of the controlling legal standard provide
for litigations to address the threshold question of which

283

See, e.g., Dennis F. Whigham & Thomas E. Jordan, Isolated Wetlands and Water

Quality, 23 WETLANDS 541, 541-43, 547-48 (2003) (confirming findings that "the
majority of so-called isolated wetlands are really not isolated but instead have...
hydrologic connections to other waters and wetlands" and concluding that "alteration of
the wetlands would result in undesirable water-quality impacts on downstream surface
waters and subsurface waters connected to local and regional ground-water systems"); see
also Thomas C. Winter & James W. LaBaugh, Hydrologic Considerations in Defining
Isolated Wetlands, 23 WETLANDS 532, 533 (2003) (finding that most so-called isolated
wetlands are in fact hydrologically linked).
284 Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2265 (2006).
285 Id.
286 U.S. v. Gerke, 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of
Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006).
287 See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 6-7, U.S. v. Gerke, No. 04-3941 (7th Cir.
2006) (available at http://rapanos.typepad.com/GerkePetition.pdf) (last visited January 7,
2007); see also U.S. v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2006) (Torruella, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (advocating the plurality as the controlling
standard based on his reading of Rapanos).
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standard to apply.2 8 8 Indeed, the lower courts so far have issued
opinions arguing all sides.28 9
A concurring opinion authored by a single Justice in a
fractured decision by the Supreme Court has become controlling
law in the past. For example, in Regents of Univ. of Calif. v.
Bakke,290 the Court issued a 5-4 plurality decision containing a
lone concurrence authored by Justice Powell which became
recognized as controlling by some lower courts. 291 Similarly, in
Branzburg v. Hayes,292 the Court issued a 5-4 majority decision
with a short concurrence authored by Justice Powell that was
interpreted by some lower courts as creating a plurality ruling.29 3
Based on Bakke and Branzburg it may be argued that Justice
Kennedy's lone concurrence in Rapanos is controlling. However,
this Note addresses these cases simply to alert the reader that in
the past, lone concurring opinions have become the controlling
rule of law in some cases. Certainly, there is precedent for courts
to consider whether this is possible with regard to Justice
Kennedy's "significant nexus" test in Rapanos.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Rapanos, lower courts will
have to ask whether the plurality's test or Justice Kennedy's test
is controlling and why. According to Marks v. United States,29 4
when the Supreme Court decides a case and "no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by

28

See, e.g., Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (addressing the question of whether

to apply the plurality's standard or the Kennedy standard in light of the complexity of the
issue and the varying approach of other courts).
289 For a useful summary of the Federal Circuit courts split on application of the
Rapanos decision, see Laura Fandino and Jeff Kray, Marten Law Group, Federal Circuit
Courts Split on Application of Supreme Court's Rapanos Decision, Dec. 6, 2006,
http://www.martenlaw.com/news/?20061206-rapanos-application.
290 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
291 See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Bakke controlled). But see
Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (deciding in contravention of Justice Powell).
292 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
293 See, e.g., Williams v. American Broadcasting Co. Inc., 96 F.R.D. 658, 667 (W.D.
Ark. 1983) (observing that since Justice Powell's three-paragraph concurrence was needed
to make up the majority in Branzburg it became the controlling rule of law); see also
J.J.C. v. Fridell, 165 F.R.D. 513, 515 (D. Minn. 1995) (noting that despite the ambiguity in
determining the controlling standard in Branzburg a majority of courts acknowledged
Justice Powell's opinion as controlling).
294 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
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those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."295

On August 10, 2006 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals became
the first federal appellate court to apply Rapanos. In Northern
2 9 6 the Ninth
California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg,
Circuit concluded that "Basalt Pond," a water-filled rock quarry
pit separated from the Russian River by a man-made levee,
possessed a "significant nexus" to a navigable-in-fact body of
water.2 97 Citing the Marks rule noted above, the court concluded
without further analysis that Justice Kennedy's "significant
nexus" test provided the controlling rule of law presumably
because the court believed it concurred on the "narrowest
grounds. 2 98
Another post-Rapanos case decided on June 28, 2006 in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas attempted
299
to apply Rapanos. In United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.,
the court held that Chevron Pipe Line's discharge of 3000 barrels
of oil into an intermittent stream near Snyder, Texas did not
invoke CWA jurisdiction because the stream bed lacked a
"significant nexus" to any navigable-in-fact body of water.3 °°
Although the court relied on Justice Kennedy's significant nexus
test without analysis of the Marks rule, it noted that "without
any clear direction on determining a significant nexus, this Court
will feel its way on a case-by-case basis., 30 1 As a result, the court
looked to prior precedent in the Fifth Circuit to determine the
proper standard to be applied. 30 2 Relying on In re Needham, 3 3 a
Fifth Circuit case that articulated that the relevant question is
whether "the farthest traverse of the spill" reached navigable
waters, the District Court found only speculative evidence at best
Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006).
117 Id. at 1025-26 (describing Basalt Pond).
299 Id.
at 1029-30 (concluding without further discussion that Justice Kennedy's
295
296

significant nexus standard is controlling).
299 437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
300 Id. at 613. "Thus, as a matter of law in this circuit, the connection of generally dry
channels and creek beds will not suffice to create a "significant nexus" to a navigable
water simply because one feeds into the next during the rare times of actual flow." Id.
301 Id. (citing Rapanos v.U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006)).
302 Id.
("Because Justice Kennedy failed to elaborate on the "significant nexus"
required, this Court will look to the prior reasoning in this circuit.").
303 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2001).
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that the discharged oil could have reached a navigable-in-fact
body of water or those waters adjacent thereto. °4
On September 22, 2006, the Seventh Circuit concluded in
United States v. Gerke Excavating3°5 that in light of the Rapanos
decision, the case before it should be remanded for further factfinding in order to apply Justice Kennedy's significant nexus
test.30 6 Interpreting the Marks rule, the Gerke court found that
"[w]hen a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the
outcome of the case and not on the ground for that outcome,
lower-court judges are to follow the narrowest grounds to which a
majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to
choose. 30 7 Interestingly, the court made the argument that in the
situations where Justice Kennedy would uphold jurisdiction the
four dissenting Justices would always agree with him, and
conversely, in the situations where Justice Kennedy would not
uphold jurisdiction the four plurality Justices would almost
always agree with him.30 8 Thus, Justice Kennedy's concurrence is

304 U.S. v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 614 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (discussing
how evidence at trial showing 30 year rainfall averages indicating a potential for rainfall
events in the region to saturate the dry creek beds sufficiently to convey the crude oil far
enough to reach navigable waters was speculative and insufficient to establish that a
rainfall event had actually occurred and actually conveyed the crude oil to any navigable
water during the time in question).
30 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).

306 Id. at 725.

0 Id. at 724 (citing Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
Id. at 724-25. 'The plurality Justices thought that Justice Kennedy's ground for
reversing was narrower than their own, because they concluded their extensive and in
places harsh criticism of the concurrence by saying that 'Justice Kennedy tips a wink at
the agency [i.e., the Corps of Engineers], inviting it to try tits same expansive reading
again' . . . [Justice Kennedy's] test is narrower (so far as reigning in federal authority is
concerned) than the plurality's in most cases, though not in all because Justice Kennedy
also said that 'by saying the Act covers wetlands (however remote) possessing a surface
water connection with a continuously flowing stream (however small), the plurality's
reading would permit application of the statute as far from traditional federal authority
as are the waters it deems beyond the statute's reach.' Thus, any conclusion that Justice
Kennedv reaches in favor of federal authority over wetlands in a future case will
command the suDort of five Justices (himself plus the four dissenters), and in most cases
in which he concludes that there is no federal authoritv he will command five votes
(himself plus the four Justices in the Rapanos pluralitv), the exception being a case in
which he would vote against federal authority only to be outvoted 8-to-i (the four
dissenting Justices plus the members of the Ravanos plurality) because there was a slight
surface hvdroloeical connection. The pluralitv's insistence that the issue of federal
authority be governed bv strict rules will on occasion align the Justices in the pluralitv
with the Rapanos dissenters when the balancing approach of Justice Kennedy favors the
landowner. But that will be a rare case. so as a practical matter the Kennedy concurrence
is the least common denominator (always, when his view favors federal authority)." Id.
301
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in Rapanos and is
the "least common denominator" 3decided
09
therefore the controlling rule of law.
On August 2, 2006, the Middle District of Florida also
addressed the question of a controlling standard. In United
States v. Evans,31 ° the court concluded that CWA jurisdiction can
be found if either the plurality's test or Justice Kennedy's test is
met.31 1 Interpreting the Marks rule by stating that the
"'narrowest grounds' is understood as the 'less far-reaching'
common ground," the Evans court posited that neither the
plurality nor the concurrence exhibited a "less far-reaching"
common ground because both opinions articulated a different
standard. 12 Thus, the court agreed with Justice Stevens'
assertion that both opinions provide a basis for federal
jurisdiction.
On October 31, 2006, the District of Massachusetts, in United
States v. Johnson,31 3 issued an opinion addressing the
uncertainties surrounding the application of the Marks rule to
Rapanos and offering in-depth analysis of the various
interpretations that may be applied. What emerged was a
framework supporting valid legal arguments that either the
plurality, or the concurrence, or both opinions may be considered
controlling depending on what stance an advocate wishes to take.
The Johnson court, citing Justice Stevens' directive, held that
CWA jurisdiction may be established by application of either the
plurality or Justice Kennedy's standard.31 4 In an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, one Circuit Justice
agreed with the majority's decision to remand the case for further
fact-finding, but disagreed with the majority's endorsement of
either standard finding that "[lt]he plurality's 'hydrological
connection' test provides the proper constitutional limit on
federal regulation .... 315

309 Id. (holding Justice Kennedy's proposed standard, as the least common
denominator, must govern litigation).
310 No. 05-CR-159, 2006 WL 2221629, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006).
311 Id. (acknowledging Justice Stevens's directive in Rapanos and holding that either

plurality's or Justice Kennedy's standard may be used to establish jurisdiction).
312 Id.
313 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006).
314 See id. at 60 ("We conclude that the U.S. may assert jurisdiction over the target
sites if it meets either Justice Kennedy's legal standard or that of the plurality.").
315 See id. at 66 (Torruella, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Citing Marks, the Johnson majority noted that the legal
standard that arises out of a fractured opinion must be 'viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds."' 3 16 The court then
addressed the question of which standard may be considered the
"narrowest." Analyzing the Marks case, the Johnson court
explained that in both Marks and the previous case upon which
the Supreme Court derived its Marks rule,31 7 the 'narrowest
ground' was also the ground least restrictive of federal
jurisdiction .... , Based on this premise, it may be argued that
Justice Kennedy's standard, because it is generally accepted as
permitting broader federal authority, is the least restrictive on
the federal government and thus controlling. 3 9 However, the
Johnson court aptly noted that acceptance of this premise does
not answer the question of "how one would determine which
opinion is controlling in a case where the government is not a
party."320 Moreover, it may be argued that based on the
constitutional question implicated by the outer limits of the
Commerce Clause arising from a broader allocation of federal
authority, the "narrowest ground" should be understood as the

316 Id. at 65.
317

See id. at 62 ("The 'narrowest grounds' approach emerged when the [Marks] Court

examined... Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)..
(discussing Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977))).
318 Id. at 63.
319 Justice Kennedy raised the issue of a remote wetland with a tenuous, yet
continuous, surface connection to navigable waters. Kennedy argued that such a wetland
would satisfy the plurality's test, but fail the significant nexus test. However, he
improperly characterized the holding of the plurality opinion. Specifically, Justice Scalia
asserted that only wetlands which implicate the boundary-drawing problem in Riverside,
in that they are indistinguishable from directly-adjacent navigable waters, are covered
under the plurality's standard. It is difficult to imagine that a remote wetland connected
to navigable waters by a mere continuous trickle could garner the approval of four
plurality Justices. Indeed, in U.S. v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., the court acknowledged that
Justice Kennedy's hypothetical wetland would be a "rare case." 464 F.3d 723, 725 (2006).
Further, in Rapanos, Justice Kennedy's hypothetical was utilized to argue that regulation
of a remote wetland connected by a mere trickle to navigable waters implicates the outer
limits of the commerce power. Thus, the workability of the plurality's standard was called
into question and the validity of the significant nexus standard was bolstered. Justice
Stevens noted, in his dissent, that Justice Kennedy's approach will be controlling in most
cases "because it treats more of the Nation's waters as within the Corps' jurisdiction, but
in the unlikely event that that the plurality's test is met but Justice Kennedy's is not,
courts should also uphold the Corps' jurisdiction." Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2265
n.14 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
320 U.S. v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2006).
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standard most restrictive of federal jurisdiction. 321 Accordingly,
the plurality's standard is controlling under this premise.
Noting the inefficacy of the previous analysis, the Johnson
court looked to the Evans court, which articulated the "narrowest
grounds" to be the 'less far-reaching' common ground. ''a 22 The
Johnson court interpreted this language to define the controlling
standard as that opinion which is "more closely tailored" to the
specific fact situation such that it is a "logical subset" of the other
broader opinion. 323 According to the Johnson majority, this
approach makes sense when "two opinions reach the same result
for less sweeping reasons than the other. 32 4 Specifically, "[w]hen
applied to future cases, the less sweeping opinion would require
the same outcome in a subset of cases that the more sweeping
opinion would. 3 2 5
Unfortunately, applying this new articulation of the Marks
rule once again yields inconsistent results. On the one hand, it is
easy to argue that the plurality's standard, which confers
jurisdiction only over "those wetlands with a continuous surface
connection" to navigable waters such that "they are
indistinguishable" from adjacent covered waters, is a logical
subset of the broader "significant nexus" test which presumably
covers more remote wetlands, easily distinguishable from
adjacent covered waters, having a significant ecological affect
thereon. Indeed, Justice Stevens' dissent endorsed this view by
stating that "Justice Kennedy's approach will be controlling in
most cases because it treats more of the Nation's waters within
the Corps' jurisdiction .... ,,326
On the other hand, Justice
Kennedy, in his opinion, fashioned an argument that the
"significant nexus" test is actually narrower in some instances
than the plurality's test. 327 Citing the plurality's use of the
"continuous surface connection" element, Justice Kennedy
postulated that a small but continuously flowing stream creating
321 See id. ("[G]iven the underlying constitutional question presented by
Rapanos...
the narrowest ground of decision in Rapanos is the ground most restrictive of government
authority (the position of the plurality), because that ground avoids the constitutional
issue of how far Congress can go in asserting jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.").
... Id. at 60.
...Id. at 63-64.
324 Id. at 64.
325

Id.

326

Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2265 n.14 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

327

Id. at 2246.
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a surface water connection to a remote intrastate wetland could
provide the basis for CWA jurisdiction under the plurality's test
while undoubtedly failing the "significant nexus" test.3 2
Therefore, in some unlikely instances, Justice Kennedy's test
may be considered a logical subset of the plurality's test.
Based on this fictional application of the outer limits of each
standard, the Johnson court, much like the Gerke court,
advocated a "common sense" approach whereby the view of the
dissenting Justices should be rationally applied to the above
scenarios in order to determine whether a majority of Justices in
any given situation would concur in the result. 329 Because the
four dissenting Justices would uphold jurisdiction in every
situation evaluated under either test, the question becomes
whether there is a situation where the plurality's standard or
Justice Kennedy's standard would win the most votes.3 3 °
Specifically, in a situation where CWA jurisdiction is upheld by
Justice Kennedy but struck down by the plurality, combining
votes of all the Justices would yield a 5-4 majority favoring
Justice Kennedy. On the other hand, in the unlikely event noted
above involving a remote wetland with a continuous surface
connection which would satisfy the plurality but fail the
concurrence, combining votes would yield an 8-1 majority
favoring the plurality. Therefore, according to the Johnson court,
the common sense voting approach militates towards recognizing
either the plurality or Justice Kennedy's standard as controlling
because there are plausible situations in which either
standard
331
Justices.
of
majority
a
by
concurrence
a
garner
would
328 Id. "On the other hand, by saying the Act covers wetlands (however remote)
possessing a surface-water connection (however small), the plurality's reading would
permit application of the statute as far from traditional federal authority as are the
waters it deems beyond the statute's reach." Id.
329 U.S. v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2006). The Court stated:
Following Justice Stevens's instruction ensures that lower courts will find jurisdiction
in all cases where a majority of the Court would support such a finding. If Justice
Kennedy's test is satisfied, then at least Justice Kennedy plus the four dissenters
would support jurisdiction. If the plurality's test is satisfied, then at least the four
plurality members plus the four dissenters would support jurisdiction. Other circuits
have previously taken this common sense approach to fragmented opinions.
Id.
330 Id.; U.S. v. Gerke Excavating Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Marks
v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
331 Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64 (stating that finding a "common ground" shared by the
majority of the justices is the common sense approach and is the same approach followed
by other circuits); see U.S. v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that
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In Gerke, the Court, noting the fictional instance where the
plurality Justices could be aligned with the dissenting Justices in
an 8-1 majority, dismissed this academic exercise as a "rare
case," finding that "as a practical matter the Kennedy
concurrence is the least common denominator ...."332 In
contrast, the Johnson Court, acknowledging such a fictional
plurality-dissent alignment, found that neither standard in
Rapanos can be characterized as the "narrowest ground," and
therefore, as per Justice Stevens' directive, either standard may
be applied by lower courts.3 3 This author believes that Johnson's
reliance on the fictional plurality-dissent alignment improperly
characterizes the plurality's holding which pointedly defined the
continuous surface connection element in terms of the boundarydrawing problem observed in Riverside. It seems implausible to
find an application of the plurality's test as establishing
jurisdiction over a remote wetland attached to a minimally
sufficient continuous stream based on an invocation of the
boundary-drawing problem.3 3 4 Indeed, it is most likely that a
remote wetland would be clearly distinguishable from any nearby
open body of water.

the majority of the court needs to find a common legal standard which produces results
with which the majority can agree with).
332 Gerke, 464 F.3d at 723.
333 Id. at 61. The carefully acknowledged that "[w]hen a majority of the Supreme
Court agrees only on the outcome of a case and not on the ground for that outcome, lowercourt judges are to follow the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would
have assented if forced to choose." Id. Furthermore,
[tihis understanding of "narrowest grounds" as used in Marks does not translate
easily to the present situation. The cases in which Justice Kennedy would limit
federal jurisdiction are not a subset of the cases in which the plurality would limit
jurisdiction. As Gerke points out, in cases where there is a small surface water
connection to a stream or brook, the plurality's jurisdictional test would be
satisfied, but Justice Kennedy's balancing of interests might militate against
finding a significant nexus. In such a case, if Justice Kennedy's test is the single
controlling test (as advocated by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits), there would be a
bizarre outcome-the court would find no federal jurisdiction even though eight
Justices (the four members of the plurality and the four dissenters) would all agree
that federal authority should extend to such a situation. This possibility
demonstrates the shortcomings of the Marks formulation in applying Rapanos.
Id at 64. This holding was based on Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976) which held
that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds ....[sic]" (quoting Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
334 See, e.g., Gerke, 464 F.3d at 724 (indicating that Justice Kennedy, in Rapanos V.
U.S., concurred in the judgment, but not in the plurality opinion).
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In Rapanos, Chief Justice Roberts issued a short concurring
opinion foretelling of the inevitable disagreements that have
manifested in cases like Gerke and Johnson.335 Noting the lack of
a clear majority, the Chief Justice, in a display of subtle
indignation, cited Grutter v. Bollinger3 3 6 to shed light on the
breadth of uncertainty flowing from the Rapanos decision.3 3 7 In
Grutter, the Court questioned whether Justice Powell's lone
concurring opinion in Bakke became the controlling rule, noting
that in the aftermath of the case the lower courts were divided on
the issue.338 Moreover, the Grutter Court explained that the
Marks rule should not be pursued to the "utmost logical
possibility when it has so easily
baffled and divided the lower
339
it.
considered
have
that
courts
By citing the Grutter Court's criticism of the Marks rule, the
Chief Justice lends support for a non-application of Marks to the
present situation. As illustrated by the Gerke and Johnson
analysis of expected voting ratios under varying logical
possibilities, the Marks rule can easily yield opposing and
baffling results. 34 ° Indeed, the Grutter Court's criticism of Marks
highlighted the lower court splits that occurred after Bakke and
explained that following Marks to its utmost logical possibilities
may prove unworkable. Ironically, by engaging in an academic
exercise of logical possibilities the post-Rapanos lower court
rulings have already exhibited an array of incompatible results.
The practical effect of the post-Rapanos confusion and the
applicability or non-applicability of the Marks rule is that
creative lawyers and judges can choose to apply whatever
335 See Rapanos,126 S. Ct. at 2236 ("Lower courts and regulated entities will
now have
to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.")
336 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
33' Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236.
338 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 ("In the wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts
have struggled to discern whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale, set forth in part of
the opinion joined by no other Justice, is nonetheless binding precedent under Marks.").
319 Id. (citing Nichols v. U.S., 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994)) (internal quotes omitted)
(asserting that the degree of confusion that follows a splintered decision is itself a reason
for reexamining that decision).
340 This is evident by the current Circuit Court split following the decision in Rapanos,
126 S. Ct. at 2208, where the Court found that the CWA's "waters of the United States"
included only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water.
Further evidence is the previous Circuit Court split in the aftermath of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), where the Court found that an applicant's race could be
considered in school's admissions program if it was factored in with other characteristics
in a competitive process.
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standard best fits their needs. For example, in a panel on
jurisdiction at an American Bar Association conference in
Washington, D.C., an advocate for the National Association of
Home Builders asserted that the plurality's test "is the only area
of jurisdiction., 341' At that same conference, an advocate for the
Environmental Defense Fund argued that Justice Kennedy's
3 4 3 case noted
standard should be controlling.3 42 In the Healdsburg
above, the Pacific Legal Foundation, an organization devoted to
limited government and property rights, argued in favor of the
plurality, citing Marks and asserting that the plurality's
standard is obviously the narrowest ground.3 4 4 In the same case,
attorneys for the Western Environmental Law Center argued in
favor of Justice Kennedy's approach. 34 5 Based on this author's
reading of Rapanos and the positions taken by various interest
groups, the plurality's test limits federal authority to the greatest
extent. Thus, it is no surprise that advocates for property rights
side with the plurality and advocates for environmental
protection and increased federal regulatory authority side with
Kennedy.

341

Delay Could Give EPA Time To Win Court Support for Dual Water Test, 15 WATER

POLY REP. 22 (Inside Wash. Publishers, Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Delay]; see Upcoming
Appellate Case Could Answer Key CWA Jurisdiction Question, 15 WATER POL'Y REP. 18
(Inside Wash. Publishers, Sep. 4, 2006) (commenting on how the National Association of
Home Builders filed an amici brief saying Marks should be the controlling guide for the
court).
342 Delay, supra note 341; see Just-Released EPA Wetlands Guide May Face Rare
Facial Challenge, 16 WATER POLY REP. 12 (Inside Wash. Publishers, June 11, 2007)
(describing how the EPA's guidelines' use of the "significant nexus" test is far more
limited than Justice Kennedy had intended in Rapanos).
3 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006).
344 Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, N. Cal.
River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-15442),
available at http://www.law.emory.edu/index.php?id=3302 (arguing that the plurality's
standard is the logical subset of the broader significant nexus standard); see Hearing on
Status of the Nation's Waters, Including Wetlands, under the Jurisdictionof the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env't of the H.
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure,110th Cong. (2007) (statement of M. Reed Hopper,
Principle Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation).
35 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 18-19, N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457
F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-15442) available at 2004 WL 2294233 (positing that
many courts have interpreted SWANCC narrowly to hold that while CWA does not reach
isolated waters have no connection with navigable waters , it does reach inland waters
that share a hydrological connection with navigable waters); see Judges Subject Pond to
Federal Jurisdiction, THE DAILY JOURNAL CORPORATION, Aug. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.westernlaw.org/news/welc-in.the-news/Healdsburg%20decision%20%20water%20news.doc/view (commenting that the court's decision relied heavily on
Justice Kennedy's ruling in Rapanos).
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CONCLUSION

Given the apparent ease with which to argue in favor of the
plurality's test, it is interesting that none so far have simply
applied the plurality's standard outright.
Rather, Justice
Kennedy's standard has received widespread support by
commentators and courts alike.
Certainly there are many
reasons for such indifference to the plurality. This author
believes that Justice Kennedy's approach strikes a better balance
between the plain language and purpose of the CWA. On the one
hand, Justice Kennedy seeks to give the term "navigable" some
importance as per Riverside and SWANCC. On the other hand,
he acknowledges Congress's intent to create a comprehensive
regulatory scheme to protect downstream water quality. As a
result, the "significant nexus" standard pays due respect to these
competing limitations. In contrast, the plurality's standard pays
little deference to Congress's delegation of authority to the Corps
and thus seeks to rein in the Corps' decision making power by
applying a rigid dictionary definition of "waters" that, as a
practical matter, disregards water quality dynamics in the
western United States and denies the use of ecological
considerations in jurisdictional assessments.
Perhaps this
fallacy has prompted one commentator to suggest that the
plurality
is "extraordinarily
wrong
from
a
scientific
standpoint. 34 6

346

Delay, supra note 342.

